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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has forcefully revealed the critical
importance of timely information to identify emerging infections,
discern patterns of disease, and stop disease spread. Information about
individuals both as patients, and as ordinary people in the world is
necessary for each of these tasks. Yet the implications for information
use and efforts to achieve social justice are significant.
This Article first surveys information needs as revealed by the
pandemic. It then articulates different normative approaches to
privacy and confidentiality to develop two implications for privacy and
justice: that information gleaned in clinical care and information
possessed by public health should be far more integrated, and that
sectoral regulatory structures are deleterious. These implications
suggest a third: that notice and choice models are misguided as a
method for protecting individuals from discrimination and injustice.
Individualistic notice and choice are particularly problematic from the
perspective of risks of discrimination and social inequality. The Article
concludes by suggesting that U.S. law should move away from the
notice and choice model as the primary method for protecting privacy.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION IN AND BEYOND THE IMMEDIACY
OF A PANDEMIC EMERGENCY
Pandemics may emerge quickly and without warning. They are
especially likely to involve novel infection strains or infections because
populations lacking immunity from prior infections or inoculation will
be vulnerable to disease spread.1 Development of disease strains that
are resistant to available antimicrobials,2 along with the burgeoning
intrusions of human beings into formerly wild ecosystems,3 and the
impacts of climate change on ecosystems4 all have increased the risks
of pandemic infection. It is therefore critically important to be able to

1. How Pandemic Influenza Emerges, WHO REG’L OFF. EUR., https://www.euro.who.int/
en/health-topics/communicable-diseases/influenza/pandemic-influenza/how-pandemicinfluenza-emerges [https://perma.cc/X4CL-VEQT].
2. CDC, Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease Threats: A Prevention Strategy for the
United States Executive Summary, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.: RECOMMENDATIONS
& REPS., Apr. 15, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Addressing Disease Threats].
3. Christine K. Johnson et al., Global Shifts in Mammalian Population Trends Reveal
Key Predictors of Virus Spillover Risk, 287 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B, Apr. 8, 2020, at 2.
4. Mark Everard et al., The Role of Ecosystems in Mitigation and Management of Covid19 and Other Zoonoses, 111 ENV’T SCI. & POL’Y 7, 9–10 (2020).
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identify infections of novel kinds as they emerge in real time before
they become a widespread threat to health. As infection begins to take
hold, identifying patterns of spread can be central to determining where
populations are especially vulnerable, what protective mechanisms are
needed, and what care modalities will be essential.5 Traditional public
health measures such as case identification and contact tracing are also
core methods to interrupt disease transmission; they are deployed after
cases appear and can reduce or ideally halt disease incidence at least until
community spread outstrips their efficacy.6 These tasks require a wide
range of information from different sources, as further described below.
A. Information to Identify Emerging Infections
Zoonoses—diseases that pass from non-human animals to humananimals—pose particularly deadly pandemic threats.7 To identify
potentially emerging infections, types of surveillance must extend beyond
human beings to include environmental monitoring, livestock
monitoring, animal husbandry (especially in crowded urban conditions),
live animal markets, and species trafficking. The “One Health” approach
emphasizes the importance of such monitoring beyond actual
occurrences of disease in human beings.8 Environmental monitoring
should include observation of unusual patterns of non-human animal
morbidity and mortality and changes in species prevalence, especially in
the interface between humans and wild lands. It must also include
surveillance of microbial drift, including sequencing of circulating viruses.
Political strife, environmental injustice, and structural disadvantage can all
hamper these efforts.

5. JOHN G. FRANCIS & LESLIE P. FRANCIS, SUSTAINING SURVEILLANCE: THE
IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 118 (Michael J. Selgelid ed., Pub.
Health Ethics Analysis, Ser. No. 6, 2021).
6. See id. at 50.
7. Zoonoses: Beyond the Human-Animal-Environment Interface, LANCET, July 4, 2020,
at 1; see also WHO, REG’L OFF. FOR THE E. MEDITERRANEAN, ZOONOTIC DISEASE: EMERGING
PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS IN THE REGION 1 (2013), http://www.emro.who.int/
pdf/about-who/rc61/zoonotic-diseases.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/E7CF-BK3Q].
8. E.g., Peter MacGarr Rabinowitz et al., A Planetary Vision for One Health, 3 BRIT.
MED. J. GLOB. HEALTH, Nov. 2018, at 1; Donna Behler McArthur, Emerging Infectious
Diseases, 54 NURSING CLINICS N. AM. 297, 298 (2019); see also Andy Haines et al., Planetary
Health Watch: Integrated Monitoring in the Anthropocene Epoch, 2 LANCET PLANETARY
HEALTH 141, 141 (2018) (describing Planetary Health Watch, a similar approach to
One Health’s integrated monitoring technique).
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Public health infrastructure is critical to this integrated surveillance
effort, yet coordinated efforts to implement and maintain surveillance
are relatively recent.9 The journal Emerging Infectious Diseases began
publishing in 1995, just after the United States Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) developed a prevention strategy for the
United States.10 The CDC established its “Emerging Infections
Program” that same year.11 That program includes a network of ten
state health departments and collaborations with many other academic
institutions, public health agencies, clinical laboratories, and health
care providers.12
As SARS-CoV-2 and the spread of COVID-19 disease forcefully
revealed, effective surveillance must be international and must include
regions of the world where emerging infections are especially likely to
occur. The World Health Organization (WHO) established the Emerging
Diseases Clinical Assessment and Response Network (EDCARN) in 2015
to establish the capacity to respond proactively to emerging threats.13
One of the tasks of EDCARN is implementing the International Health
Regulations (IHR).14
The IHR, which entered into force in June 2007,15 represented a
major change from surveillance limited to specified diseases, to surveillance
aimed to identify health emergencies of international concern.16 The
Regulations require each State Party to “develop, strengthen and
maintain . . . the capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events . . . .”17
The WHO is obligated to assist States Parties who request aid in these

9. David Satcher, Emerging Infections: Getting Ahead of the Curve, EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Jan.–Mar. 1995, at 1–6.
10. Addressing Disease Threats, supra note 2, at 14.
11. About EIP, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dpei/eip/eip-about.html
[https://perma.cc/GK6B-9C4B] (last modified Oct. 15, 2018).
12. Id.
13. DAVID P. ADAMS, FOUNDATIONS OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE: A PUBLIC HEALTH
PERSPECTIVE 370 (2021).
14. Implementing the International Health Regulations, WHO, https://www.who.int/
westernpacific/activities/implementing-the-international-health-regulations
[https://perma.cc/U3Q2-3HQQ].
15. International Health Regulations Enter into Force, WHO (June 14, 2007),
https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2007/pr31/en
[https://perma.cc/7L7H-7NNA].
16. International Health Regulations (2005), at 2, adopted May 23, 2005, 2509
U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter IHR 2005].
17. Id. art. 5(1).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3833629

2021] HEALTH INFORMATION BEYOND PANDEMIC EMERGENCIES 1633
efforts.18 The WHO is also obligated to collect information through
surveillance and assess their potential to cause international disease
spread.19 Further, the WHO must determine whether an event constitutes
a public health emergency of international concern based on information
from the State Party, advice of its Emergency Committee, available
scientific evidence, and assessments of risks to human health,
international spread, and interference with international traffic.20
Currently, 196 nations are States Parties to the IHR including both
China and the United States.21 The United States became a State Party
with reservations and understandings including that its obligations
remain consistent with principles of federalism.22 China included a
declaration that it had established a coordinating mechanism for
implementing the IHR.23 States Parties have obligations to notify WHO
of events that may constitute public health emergencies of international
concern.24 The WHO may accept reports of potential emergencies from
other entities such as non-governmental organizations, but must verify
these with State Parties, which have obligations to respond quickly on
the status of events.25 States Parties also “undertake to collaborate with
each other, to the extent possible” in detecting and responding to events
and in providing support for maintaining surveillance capacities.26 This
language characterized mutual support as an “undertaking” under the
IHR, however, not a concrete obligation. Placing mutual support in this
category presents significant problems of justice if wealthier countries
expect countries lacking resources to provide them with information
and then do not help in supporting needed infrastructure or in

18. Id. art. 5(3).
19. Id. art. 5(4).
20. Id. art. 12.
21. Strengthening Health Security by Implementing the International Health Regulations (2005),
WHO, https://www.who.int/ihr/legal_issues/states_parties/en [https://perma.cc/BF8CXP9U].
22. Diplomatic Note from the Permanent Mission of the U.S. to the United
Nations [U.N.] Off. and Other Int’l Orgs. (Dec. 13, 2006). As primary responsibility
for public health lies with the states, this may mean that surveillance information in
the United States is incomplete.
23. Diplomatic Note from the Permanent Mission of China to the U.N. Off. at
Geneva and Other Int’l Orgs. (May 12, 2007).
24. IHR 2005, supra note 16, art. 6.
25. Id. arts. 9–10.
26. Id. art. 44.
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sharing benefits of the information gained. Breakdowns in
cooperation and woefully inadequate information may be the result.27
The WHO declared COVID-19 a public health emergency of
international concern on January 30, 2020,28 and a pandemic on
March 11, 2020.29 This response has been vehemently criticized as too
little and too late.30 The Trump Administration blamed China and the
WHO for complicity with China, giving notice in July 2020 of the
United States’ intention to withdraw from the WHO and subsequent
redirection of funding from the WHO to other organizations,31 notice
that the Biden Administration began to undo from its very first day.32
Some observers attribute both the WHO’s delay and subsequent
difficulties in encouraging States Parties to follow guidance to the
WHO’s lack of enforcement authority as well as to its very limited
economic resources.33 Richard Horton, editor of The Lancet, has been
strongly critical of the WHO’s lack of authority and resulting
27. Indonesia’s decision to withhold samples of the H5N1 influenza virus in 2005
is an example. Endang R. Sedyaningsih et al., Towards Mutual Trust, Transparency and
Equity in Virus Sharing Mechanism: The Avian Influenza Case of Indonesia, 37 ANNALS ACAD.
MED. SING. 482, 482 (2008). Current controversies over COVID-19 vaccine allocation
raise similar concerns. See, e.g., WHO, WHO CONCEPT FOR FAIR ACCESS AND EQUITABLE
ALLOCATION OF COVID-19 HEALTH PRODUCTS 5–6 (2020), https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/fair-allocation-mechanism-for-covid-19-vaccines-through-thecovax-facility [https://perma.cc/V67E-4B47]; Lisa M. Herzog et al., Covax Must Go
Beyond Proportional Allocation of Covid Vaccines to Ensure Fair and Equitable Access, BRIT.
MED. J., Jan. 5, 2021, at 1.
28. WHO, COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN
(PHEIC) 2 (2020), https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-publichealth-emergency-of-international-concern-(pheic)-global-research-and-innovationforum [https://perma.cc/9X6Y-QHVT].
29. Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID 19, WHO (June 29, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline
[https://perma.cc/M4F2-C759].
30. Amy Maxmen, Why Did the World’s Pandemic Warning System Fail when COVID
Hit?, NATURE (Jan. 23, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00162-4
[https://perma.cc/4LGG-AWCX].
31. Update on U.S. Withdrawal from the World Health Organization, U.S. DEP’T STATE
(Sept. 3, 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/update-on-u-s-withdrawal-from-theworld-health-organization//index.html [https://perma.cc/BCG5-UARK].
32. Aishvaryi Kavi, Biden’s 17 Executive Orders and Other Directives in Detail, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/us/biden-executive-orders
.html [https://perma.cc/52YA-ECFN].
33. Stephen Buranyi, The WHO v Coronavirus: Why It Can’t Handle the Pandemic,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/
apr/10/world-health-organization-who-v-coronavirus-why-it-cant-handle-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/C3FC-T3BD].
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degradation of its ability to support rights to health.34 Other critics
observe the complementary roles in the delay played by faulty scientific
assumptions, academic rivalries, and political reluctance to face the
need for painful responses.35 In support of the WHO, the Global
Network for Academic Public Health recognized the WHO’s role in
leading response efforts, while acknowledging the limited scope of the
WHO’s responsibilities and lack of global knowledge of the novel
virus.36
Controversy over lack of transparency from China has spotlighted
the importance of information in response to threats of pandemic
disease. Investigative teams from the WHO continued to meet delays
in their efforts to explore the origins of COVID-19 infection over a year
after initial reports of the disease.37 In the final days of the Trump
Administration, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo renewed the
suggestion that the virus might have originated in a Chinese
laboratory.38 One long-term assessment is that “resistance to emerging
evidence was one part of the world’s sluggish response to the virus.”39
In sum, early detection of infectious agents with the potential for
pandemic spread involves international cooperation in obtaining and
analyzing extensive information drawn from both non-human and
human sources. Backgrounds of injustice, however, pose challenges
for needed cooperative efforts.

34. E.g., Richard Horton, Offline: It’s Time to Convene Nations to End this Pandemic,
LANCET, July 4, 2020, at 14, 14. See generally RICHARD HORTON, Preface to THE COVID-19
CATASTROPHE: WHAT’S GONE WRONG AND HOW TO STOP IT HAPPENING AGAIN (2nd ed.
2021).
35. Matt Apuzzo et al., How the World Missed Covid-19’s Silent Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/27/world/europe/coronavirus-spreadasymptomatic.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage
[https://perma.cc/6E9G-W7JP].
36. John Middleton et al., Global Network for Academic Public Health Statement on the
World Health Organization’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 65 INT’L J. PUB. HEALTH
1523, 1523–24 (2020).
37. Javier C. Hernández, Two Members of W.H.O. Team on Trail of Virus Are Denied
Entry to China, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/
world/asia/china-who-wuhan-covid.html [https://perma.cc/6692-X6FK].
38. Michael R. Pompeo, Ensuring a Transparent, Thorough Investigation of COVID19’s Origin, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Jan. 15, 2021), https://2017-2021.state.gov/ensuring-atransparent-thorough-investigation-of-covid-19s-origin//index.html
[https://perma.cc/8QWE-WQB3].
39. Apuzzo et al., supra note 35.
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B. Syndromic Surveillance: Revealing Patterns of Disease
The likely reality is that global surveillance systems will remain
imperfect and inadequate in the face of continuing political conflict
and systemic inequality. Without effective early warning, the ability to
detect possible outbreaks of novel diseases in cooperative countries will
remain a core strategy. One particularly effective recently developed
method for identifying usual outbreaks early on is syndromic
surveillance. Syndromic surveillance is the use of artificial intelligence
to identify possible disease patterns before any actual diagnoses of
known conditions have occurred.40 Because syndromic surveillance
starts with the detection of aberrant patterns as signals of the need for
further investigation, use of the method precedes understanding of
what will be found.41 Initial uses of syndromic surveillance date back
only to the mid 1990s42 and development of methodological tools is
the subject of ongoing research.43 These methodological tools include
not only advanced statistical methods but also text and symbol
classification techniques.44 Sensitivity and specificity are important to
avoid missing possible patterns of significance and failing to separate
meaningful signals from noise.45 Understanding the impact of
publicity and social media on denominators in the data such as the
numbers of people seeking health care is also critical.46
40. Kelly J. Henning, Overview of Syndromic Surveillance, What Is Syndromic
Surveillance?, 53 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Supp. 2004, at 7, 7.
41. Leslie P. Francis et al., Syndromic Surveillance and Patients as Victims and Vectors,
6 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 187, 188 (2009).
42. Gillian E. Smith et al., Syndromic Surveillance: Two Decades Experience of Sustainable
Systems—Its People Not Just Data!, 147 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION, Feb. 22, 2019, at 1.
43. See, e.g., Andrew Wen et al., An Aberration Detection-Based Approach for Sentinel
Syndromic Surveillance of COVID-19 and Other Novel Influenza-Like Illnesses, J. BIOMEDICAL
INFORMATICS, Jan. 2021, at 2 (describing the study’s methodology for distinguishing
among closely related syndromes); Aakansha Gupta & Rahul Katarya, Social Media
Based Surveillance Systems for Healthcare Using Machine Learning: A Systematic Review, J.
BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS, Aug. 2020, at 3 (surveying methods developed for social
media to predict the disease in real-time); Prosper Kandabongee Yeng et al., Cluster
Detection Mechanisms for Syndromic Surveillance Systems: Systematic Review and Framework
Development, JMIR PUB. HEALTH SURVEILLANCE, Apr.–June 2020, at 1 (surveying the
development of cluster detection algorithms for syndromic surveillance).
44. See, e.g., Oduwa Edo-Osagie et al., Twitter Mining Using Semi-Supervised
Classification for Relevance Filtering in Syndromic Surveillance, PLOS ONE, July 18, 2019, at
3–4, 20, 22.
45. Smith et al., supra note 42, at 5.
46. Alex J. Elliot et al., The COVID-19 Pandemic: A New Challenge for Syndromic
Surveillance, 148 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION, June 18, 2020, at 2.
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Early use of syndromic surveillance in the United States and
elsewhere focused on detection of influenza and possible bioterrorist
events.47 Syndromic surveillance was used during the London
Olympics to monitor the possibility of introduction of disease.48 It has
been used to observe the health effects of heat waves in England and
in France.49 Mass religious gatherings, such as the Hajj, have been
surveilled for possible infectious disease outbreaks or other health
problems using syndromic methodology.50 The methodology has also
been widely used to detect rare drug side effects and drug-drug
interactions.51 It has been used in analyzing unrecognized frequencies
of drug overdoses.52 Other recent suggestions include the possibility
that syndromic surveillance could detect epidemics of addiction, social
isolation, and other social determinants of health.53
Health information from clinical encounters, emergency room
visits, and laboratory testing is core to syndromic surveillance, but it is
only the beginning.54 Because these data are collected only when
individuals access health care, analysis may miss lower severity
occurrences, may lag behind initial events within populations, and will
not include information drawn from people who do not access health
care. Data from social media platforms such as Twitter or Instagram
have been judged to improve the predictive ability of surveillance from
medical records, but researchers caution that use of these additional
types of data can increase risks of false positives, demographic bias, and

47. Smith et al., supra note 42, at 1; Kenneth D. Mandl et al., Implementing Syndromic
Surveillance: A Practical Guide Informed by the Early Experience, 11 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS
ASS’N 141, 141 (2004); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-877, REVIEW OF STATE
AND FEDERAL DISEASE SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS (2004).
48. Smith et al., supra note 42, at 2.
49. Id. at 2, 4.
50. Kingsley Lezor Bieh et al., Implementing the Health Early Warning System Based on
Syndromic and Event-Based Surveillance at the 2019 Hajj, 26 E. MEDITERRANEAN HEALTH J.
1570, 1570 (2020).
51. FDA’s Sentinel Initiative: Transforming How We Monitor the Safety of FDA-Regulated Products,
FDA (2019), https://www.fda.gov/safety/fdas-sentinel-initiative [https://perma.cc/28H6J8ER].
52. Douglas R. Roehler et al., Suspected Nonfatal Drug-Related Overdoses Among Youth
in the US: 2016–2019, 147 PEDIATRICS, Jan. 1, 2021, at 1.
53. David Scales, Opportunities and Challenges for Developing Syndromic Surveillance
Systems for the Detection of Social Epidemics, 12 ONLINE J. PUB. HEALTH INFORMATICS 1, 2–
4, 6 (2020).
54. Kenneth D. Mandl et al., Implementing Syndromic Surveillance: A Practical Guide
Informed by the Early Experience, 11 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASSOC. 141, 141, 143 (2004).
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privacy violations.55 Other data sources include internet search
queries, Facebook “likes,” and other functions.56 Google Flu Trends
initially received a great deal of publicity for predicting influenza
outbreaks about 7-10 days before the CDC.57 Such uses of search query
data may be confounded by noise and thus lack positive predictive
value, but one analysis indicates that Google searches may have
significantly higher sensitivity and positive predictive value than either
Twitter or Wikipedia.58 Phone or web-based polling may also gather
data for use in syndromic surveillance.59 Text messaging and other
communication methods also may be helpful in settings with limited
public health infrastructure.60
The potential for syndromic surveillance has drawn great attention
during the COVID-19 pandemic. The initial outbreak of COVID-19 in
China and the sequencing of the virus needed for diagnosis had
occurred before syndromic techniques were put in place to identify the
possibility of spread beyond China.61 Thus, extensive testing for the
identified condition might have been a method for discerning early
spread, but testing resources were limited and poorly deployed.62 In
the absence of widespread testing, syndromic surveillance can provide
early warning of possible outbreaks and the extent of community

55. Gupta & Katarya, supra note 43, at 1.
56. Id. at 6–7.
57. Herman Anthony Carneiro & Eleftherios Mylonakis, Google Trends: A Web-Based
Tool for Real-Time Surveillance of Disease Outbreaks, 49 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1557,
1557 (2009).
58. Danielle Sharpe et al., Evaluating Google, Twitter, and Wikipedia as Tools for
Influenza Surveillance Using Bayesian Change Point Analysis: A Comparative Analysis, JMIR
PUB. HEALTH & SURVEILLANCE, July-Dec. 2016, at 98; see also Andrea Freyer Dugas et al.,
Influenza Forecasting with Google Trends, PLOS ONE, Feb. 2013, at 1, 6 (noting that the
current algorithm for Google Flu Trends has predictive abilities); Gupta, supra note
43, at 6.
59. Lauren Lapointe-Shaw et al., Web and Phone-Based COVID-19 Syndromic
Surveillance in Canada: A Cross-Sectional Study, PLOS ONE, Oct. 2021, at 1, 2.
60. Larissa May et al., Beyond Traditional Surveillance: Applying Syndromic Surveillance
to Developing Settings—Opportunities and Challenges, BMC PUB. HEALTH, July 16, 2009, at 1, 4.
61. Jorden et al., Evidence for Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States,
January–February 2020, 69 MMWR 680, 680 (2020).
62. Shawn Boburg et al., Inside the Coronavirus Testing Failure: Alarm and Dismay
Among the Scientists Who Sought to Help, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/04/03/coronavirus-cdc-testkits-public-health-labs/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/J6YR-C5AV].
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spread.63 Syndromic techniques have been used to monitor the effects
on case trends of the use of internet search terms such as Lysol or face
masks.64 These techniques may be helpful in assessing the frequency
with which people with symptoms access testing.65 Syndromic
surveillance methods have also been used to detect frequency and
severity of other conditions, such as child abuse66 or opioid overdose67,
that may have been exacerbated by pandemic conditions.
The data sets used in syndromic surveillance are typically deidentified.
Data protection laws such as the European Union General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)68 and the United States Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations69 do
not apply to information once it has been deidentified except to require
protection against reidentification.70 The risk of reidentification is
typically the primary concern raised about data deidentification.71 The
concerns raised in this Section are different, however: that methods of
deidentification may have implications for social justice and that
deidentified data sets in use may present other issues of justice.
One standard deidentification method is data removal: taking out
any information about individuals that could conceivably be used to
identify them such as names, addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers,

63. Annelies Wilder-Smith et al., Can We Contain the COVID-19 Outbreak with the
Same Measures as for SARS?, LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES, May 2020, at 102, 103.
64. Shyam J. Kurian et al., Correlations Between COVID-19 Cases and Google Trends Data
in the United States: A State-by-State Analysis, 95 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 2370, 2370 (2020).
65. Lapointe-Shaw et al., supra note 59, at 1.
66. Elizabeth Swedo et al., Trends in U.S. Emergency Department Visits Related to
Suspected or Confirmed Child Abuse and Neglect Among Children and Adolescents Aged <18
Years Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic—United States, January 2019–September
2020, 69 MMWR 1841, 1841 (2020).
67. Svetla Slavova et al., Signal of Increased Opioid Overdose During COVID-19 from
Emergency Medical Services Data, DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE, Sept. 1, 2020, at 1, 1.
68. Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679 of April 27, 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119), 13 [hereinafter GDPR] (defining “personal
data” as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”).
69. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020).
70. Id. § 164.514.
71. Guidance Regarding Methods for De-Identification of Protected Health Information in
Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html#top [https://perma.cc/68GWK7HY] (noting that de-identified data always retains some risk of identification).
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and the like. In the United States, HIPAA has a list of eighteen such
factors that, if removed, render a data set presumptively deidentified.72
However, the availability of data has continued to grow exponentially
and analytic techniques have continued to improve. Depending on the
data sets being combined, it is quite possible that significant
percentages of individuals can be re-identified from data sets that have
used this removal method.73 If so, these individuals may be subject to
secondary harms that range from unwanted communications to
unfavorable interest rates on credit cards or purchases.74
Another method of deidentification is noise insertion, such as
differential privacy. This method alters a data set in such a way that
there is no way to tell whether any particular individual may or may not
have been included in the data.75 Data experts have argued that the
choice between these methods—data removal or noise insertion—
makes a practically important difference in the ability to detect
disparate impacts of policies on populations, depending on how
disparities are operationalized.76 One way of operationalizing
disparities between subpopulations is to compare separations between
their distributions of outcomes measured by means and standard
deviations. When data about outliers are removed, there will be more
false positives of identified disparity because the standard deviations
will be reduced in each subpopulation so it will appear that they are
more different than they would appear with outliers included. Noise
insertion, by contrast, will scramble up the differences between the
means and standard deviations of subpopulations, so it will make false
negatives more likely if disparities are identified by separation of these
subpopulation features.
Identifying disparities among subpopulations may be highly relevant
for many issues in pandemics and public health more generally. In
COVID-19, significant disparities have been identified between older

72. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2020).
73. Latanya Sweeney’s reidentification work is central. See Policy and Law:
Identifiability of De-Identified Data, RSCH. ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF LATANYA SWEENEY, PH. D.,
http://latanyasweeney.org/work/identifiability.html
[https://perma.cc/6VKENEQT] (listing Sweeney’s publications and research projects).
74. Stacey A. Tovino, Not so Private, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (summarizing
the literature).
75. See Heng Xu & Nan Zhang, Implications of Data Anonymization on the Statistical
Evidence of Disparity, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5–6) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3662612) (describing noise addition techniques).
76. Id. at 6.
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and younger groups and between white people and people of color.77
Identifying these disparities has called attention to ongoing issues
about health disparities, access to care, and social determinants of
health. Identifying differences between subpopulations also may help
to determine effective deployment of educational resources to address
the need for testing, social distancing, or vaccination. In COVID-19,
some areas have used subpopulation disparities to locate testing sites
among groups that are especially hard-hit by the virus.78 These are just
a few examples of how over- or under-detection of disparities could be
significant in addressing populations in a pandemic.
Another serious problem with the use of data for syndromic
surveillance concerns the initial data. The data may be of poor quality
or significantly unrepresentative of the population in question. For
example, sets of health data that include primarily patients of
European descent may provide very poor information about people
not of European descent. In a pandemic, the data that are initially
available may over-sample people with ready access to care and people
who are more seriously ill. Minorities who lack access to care or people
who are implicitly triaged-against for care (such as people with
disabilities who cannot decide on their own to seek out care)79 may be
underrepresented in the data. Data may also be significantly biased
because they reflect other biases in society.80 For example, if COVID19 testing is deployed widely in white communities while people of
77. See, e.g., Hannah Recht & Lauren Weber, Black Americans Are Getting Vaccinated
at Lower Rates than White Americans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 17, 2021),
https://khn.org/news/article/black-americans-are-getting-vaccinated-at-lower-ratesthan-white-americans [https://perma.cc/4FN4-ZFNN]; CDC, Risk for COVID-19
Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by Age Group (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigationsdiscovery/hospitalization-death-by-age.html.
78. Soo Rin Kim et al., Which Cities Have the Biggest Racial Gaps in COVID-19 Testing
Access?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 22, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/whiteneighborhoods-have-more-access-to-covid-19-testing-sites.
79. See Katheryn Houghton, People with Intellectual Disabilities Are Often Overlooked in
Pandemic Response, NPR (Feb. 12, 2021, 5:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2021/02/12/967190126/people-with-intellectual-disabilities-are-oftenoverlooked-in-pandemic-response [https://perma.cc/L25F-6ZBR] (describing the
failure of health agencies to collect Covid-19 data about people with intellectual
disabilities).
80. See, e.g., Solon Baracas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 671 (2016); Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 1,
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data [https://perma.cc/9K9CQEPL].
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color have difficulty accessing testing unless they are seriously ill,
testing data will reflect higher positive test rates in people of color
because of the far smaller denominator of people tested. Statisticians
have worked to develop methods to repair data sets for disparate
impact, although at some possible cost to the utility of the data.81
C. Stopping Spread: Information About Individuals for Contact Tracing,
Isolation, and Quarantine
Syndromic surveillance detects patterns at the population level. To
interrupt chains of disease transmission, information about individual
cases is also critical for public health. In the United States, all states
require reporting diagnoses of enumerated infectious diseases.82 These
statutes vary in a number of ways, including mandated reporters, where
to submit reports, required data elements, and requirements to submit
biological materials to state laboratories.83 One concern reported by
researchers in 2015, after the experience of H1N1 influenza, was that
some states do not have explicit statutory authority for reporting novel
infections, relying on rulemaking instead. These researchers speculated
that the result might be reluctance to report truly novel infections.84
Some states do explicitly require reporting cases of pandemic
disease or novel infections that might pose significant risks.85 Other
states require the list of reportable conditions to be established by
regulation.86 All states have also enacted the authority to impose quarantine
or isolation requirements on individuals to retard disease spread.87
As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded, the U.S. response to case
detection was tepid at best. The belief was widespread that the
infection might be a problem elsewhere but was unlikely to reach the

81. Michael Feldman et al., Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact, KDD’15, Aug.
2015, at 259, 265 (explaining that “increasing fairness may result in a loss of utility”).
82. Richard N. Danila et al., Legal Authority for Infectious Disease Reporting in the
United States: Case Study of the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 13,
13 (2015).
83. Id. at 14.
84. Id. at 17.
85. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-23b-103 (West 2020) (outlining Utah’s
mandatory reporting requirements).
86. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120130(a) (West 2020).
87. State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS. (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/F3TC-GVHX].
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United States in ways that posed a serious threat.88 Some researchers
were far more concerned, however, and material from a study of
influenza in Seattle provided a perfect opportunity to explore the
possibility of community spread of COVID-19 within the United
States.89 That study, ongoing since 2018, had been collecting
specimens from subjects reporting respiratory symptoms.90 Spurred by
their concern about COVID-19, the influenza study researchers
sequenced their study specimens for the SARS-CoV-2 virus and found
evidence of community spread.91 Because their informed consent
documents had only specified testing for influenza, state regulators
denied them permission to continue their analysis for several weeks.92
The Seattle influenza study is a cautionary tale for data protection; the
result of the time delay in using the influenza study data may have been
a significant delay in understanding the extent to which community
spread of COVID-19 had taken hold in the U.S. Pacific Northwest.93
Contact tracing begins with an “index case,” a person with a
contagious disease who has become known to public health
authorities, typically through a required report of a positive test
result.94 A continuing concern about case reporting is that it will
discourage people from seeking diagnosis and treatment out of fear of
potential repercussions.95 For example, with HIV/AIDS, research
about barriers to testing indicates that people continue to fear that if
they test positive they could be subject to discrimination and loss of

88. See, e.g., Lawrence Wright, The Plague Year: The Mistakes and the Struggles Behind
America’s Coronavirus Tragedy, NEW YORKER (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2021/01/04/the-plague-year [https://perma.cc/P7J3-BGKA].
89. Helen Y. Chu et al., Early Detection of Covid-19 Through a Citywide Pandemic
Surveillance Platform, 383 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 185, 185–87 (2020).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Sheri Fink & Mike Baker, ‘It’s Just Everywhere Already’: How Delays in Testing Set
Back the U.S. Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/03/10/us/coronavirus-testing-delays.html [https://perma.cc/VEA8-K288].
See generally NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS, APOLLO’S ARROW: THE PROFOUND AND ENDURING
IMPACT OF CORONAVIRUS ON THE WAY WE LIVE 14–15 (1st ed. 2020).
93. Fink & Baker, supra note 92.
94. Matt J. Keeling et al., Efficacy of Contact Tracing for the Containment of the 2019
Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 74 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY CMTY. HEALTH 861, 862 (2020)
(describing the contact-tracing process for COVID-19).
95. Social Stigma Associated with COVID-19: A Guide to Preventing and Addressing Social
Stigma, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/covid19-stigma-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXQ7-ZMRG].
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employment, as well as condemnation from others.96 Indeed, as a
public health method, contact tracing has been widely associated with
use for stigmatized sexually transmitted diseases such as syphilis or
gonorrhea.97 With COVID-19, a primary fear in the United States is that
reporting will single out undocumented patients or family members
and lead to their deportation.98
Once an index case is identified, trained public health workers then
contact the person and interview him or her to learn about how the
infection might have been contracted and whether others might have
been exposed.99 Individuals who are infected are isolated until they are
no longer contagious; quarantine is recommended for individuals who
are likely to have been exposed until the danger of contracting
infection has passed.100 The effectiveness of this process depends on
whether the person with the positive test result can be located and
interviewed, and whether the person is able to recall, and is willing to
reveal, possible contacts.101 Some jurisdictions have resorted to

96. GP Traversy et al., An Overview of Recent Evidence on Barriers and Facilitators to
HIV Testing, 41 CCDR 304, 304 (2015); Laurel Sprague et al., Employment Discrimination
and HIV Stigma: Survey Results from Civil Society Organisations and People Living with HIV
in Africa, 10 AFR. J. AIDS RSCH. 311, 311 (2011); Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health
Strategies for Confronting AIDS: Legislative and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 261
JAMA 1621, 1621 (1989).
97. Amy Lauren Fairchild et al., Contact Tracing’s Long, Turbulent History Holds Lessons
for COVID-19, CONVERSATION (July 16, 2020), https://theconversation.com/contacttracings-long-turbulent-history-holds-lessons-for-covid-19-142511
[https://perma.cc/W5KB-292V].
98. Whitney L. Duncan & Sarah B. Horton, Serious Challenges and Potential Solutions
for Immigrant Health During COVID-19, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200416.887086/full
[https://perma.cc/3QBJ-AW2Z].
99. See Contact Tracing, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/contacttracing.html#:~:text=Contact%20tracing%20slows%20the%20spread%20of%20COV
ID%2D19&text=Asking%20people%20to%20self%2Disolate,they%20are%20a%20cl
ose%20contact [https://perma.cc/WRM3-K6LR] (describing the process of contact
tracing for COVID-19).
100. What Is the Difference Between Isolation and Quarantine?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/answers/public-health-and-safety/what-is-the-differencebetween-isolation-and-quarantine/index.html [https://perma.cc/R7Y6-J38X].
101. Dyani Lewis, Why Many Countries Failed at COVID Contact-Tracing—But Some Got
It Right, NATURE (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-035184 [https://perma.cc/TET9-AN63].
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subpoenas and threatened fines to get people to respond to contact
tracing.102
Case identification and contact tracing are challenging when a
disease and its mechanisms of transmission are poorly understood. A
disease like COVID-19, which can spread from people who are presymptomatic or even never symptomatic, presents particular
challenges; public health initially worked on the model of diseases
such as influenza where only symptomatic individuals were sources of
transmission.103 If a disease has a longer incubation period, the
individual may not remember possible exposures and possible contacts
may need to be followed for an extended period of time, making the
process less efficient and more costly. For a disease such as COVID-19,
which is transmitted through airborne droplets, it may be difficult to
determine whether people were in sufficient contact for an exposure
to have occurred. It also may be particularly difficult to follow contacts
when a disease is transmitted through fomites—for example,
doorknobs—that many people may touch. When a disease is
widespread in a population, or when exposures are difficult to identify,
educating everyone about the need for testing and precautions may be
more cost-effective than efforts to trace contacts.104
D. The Use of Smart Phones for Contact Tracing: An Additional Problem for
Privacy
The COVID-19 pandemic is the first major pandemic to occur in a
world of widespread use of smart phones. These phones and associated
technologies bring the potential for novel and enhanced methods of
identifying and tracing contacts. These methods were greeted with
initial enthusiasm as hopefully addressing the challenges for contact
tracing posed by COVID-19. These methods, however, augment risks of
harms beyond the original data collection, depending on how they are
deployed.105 Tensions between the efficacy of contact tracing and the risks

102. Teo Armus, Coronavirus Detectives Couldn’t Get Partygoers to Answer the Phone. So They
Issued Subpoenas., WASH. POST (July 3, 2020, 5:59 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2020/07/03/contact-tracing-covid-party-subpoena [https://perma.cc/B8VC-H8NX].
103. Wright, supra note 88.
104. Tessa Tan-Torres Edejer et al., Projected Health-Care Resource Needs for an Effective
Response to COVID-19 in 73 Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries: A Modelling Study, 8
LANCET GLOB. HEALTH 1372, 1374, 1376 (2020).
105. Andrew Anglemyer et al., Digital Contact Tracing Technologies in Epidemics: A
Rapid Review, 8 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS., Aug. 2020, at 1, 14, 34.
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to individuals surfaced quickly; tracing methods that are less privacyprotective tend to be more effective in reducing the risk of disease spread.
Differences among the methods using smart devices include
whether they are mandatory, opt-in, or opt-out; whether the
technology used is Bluetooth recognition or locational tracking;
whether data storage is distributed or centralized; and whether data
uses are limited solely to tracking possible COVID-19 exposures.106 The
least protective method is what has been reported to be the mandatory
approach developed in China.107 In this approach as described,
everyone who wishes to leave their home is required to install a
software system on their smart phones to score their contagion risk.108
The scoring has been described in one source as based on personal
integrity reporting and comparisons with information held by the
government.109 The system uses the score to generate a color code—
red, yellow, or green—for each user.110 The code is updated
dynamically with information about the user’s own status and status of
the area in which the user has been.111 Color codes are checked as
people move about, entering shopping malls or subway stations, for
example.112 People who are “green today” can move about freely,

106. Id. at 3, 15–17.
107. Anna Gamvros et al., Contact Tracing Apps in China: A New World for Data Privacy,
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/-/media/files/nrf/
nrfweb/contact-tracing/china-contact-tracing.pdf?revision=249d55f4-eb9a-49dd-8491b8c9c7626691&la=en-cn [https://perma.cc/3V3U-SMSM].
108. Id.
109. Alipay’s Health Code Landed in 100 Cities in 7 Days and Ran out of “Chinese Speed”,
XINHUANET (Feb. 19, 2020, 4:17 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/202002/19/c_1125596647.htm [https://perma.cc/M6VB-GNRZ] [hereinafter Alipay
Health Code] (English translation provided by Google Translate); see also ACCESS
PARTNERSHIP, DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING: A COMPARATIVE GLOBAL STUDY 17–18 (2020),
https://www.accesspartnership.com/cms/access-content/uploads/2020/05/APSpecial-Report-Global-Contact-Tracing.pdf?utm_source=POLITICO.EU
&utm_campaign=14ce019754-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_05_28_05_15&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-14ce019754-189867717
[https://perma.cc/H9HQ-B5GJ].
110. Alipay Health Code, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Raymond Zhong, China’s Virus Apps May Outlast the Outbreak, Stirring Privacy
Fears, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/
technology/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/BV79-2JBZ].
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whereas others will remain in isolation for seven or fourteen days.113
Reports have surfaced that use of the method is not limited to COVID19 surveillance.114 One Communist Party official reportedly stated that
the tracking app should be an “intimate health guardian” that is “loved
so much that you cannot bear to part with it.”115 In sum, while China
has reportedly been very effective in stopping the outbreak, and in
responding to new bursts of infection, its method allows for other
forms of surveillance that may significantly limit individual liberty and
result in other harms to individuals.
In its efforts to trace cases of COVID-19, South Korea also used a
non-voluntary method that centralized data collection. However,
South Korea’s process limits any use of the data collected to COVID19 surveillance in order to reduce the likelihood of additional
harms.116 South Korea authorized the compilation of dossiers of
confirmed patients which included smartphone data, credit card
transactions, immigration information, and footage from security
cameras.117 These dossiers were then used to identify and notify
contacts about the possibility of exposure and the need for testing and
possible isolation.118 Information about virus hotspots was also released
to the public.119 Although data about individuals was only released by
number rather than by personal identifiers, some people were
reidentified by their movement histories and “doxx[ed]” or otherwise
113. Alipay Health Code, supra note 109; Mobile Location Data and Covid-19: Q&A, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (May 13, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobilelocation-data-and-covid-19-qa [https://perma.cc/XSG2-2Z9B].
114. See, e.g., Zhong, supra note 112 (reporting that Communist Party members have
created a separate tool inspired by the virus-tracking software called the “honesty
health code,” which monitors “whether your party spirit is healthy, not whether your
body is healthy”).
115. Id.
116. See Max S. Kim, Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing, NEW YORKER
(Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seouls-radicalexperiment-in-digital-contact-tracing [https://perma.cc/C3ZE-HTKD] (noting that
data cannot, for example, be used for anti-terrorism efforts).
117. Eun A. Jo, South Korea’s Experiment in Pandemic Surveillance, DIPLOMAT (Apr. 13, 2020),
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/south-koreas-experiment-in-pandemic-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/6BP2-WDLF].
118. See Liza Lin & Timothy W. Martin, How Coronavirus Is Eroding Privacy, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-paves-way-for-new-ageof-digital-surveillance-11586963028 [https://perma.cc/8C8Z-B5KD] (explaining that
the dossiers were authorized by a broad infectious-disease law passed after the
country’s failed response to a different coronavirus outbreak).
119. Jo, supra note 117.
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stigmatized.120 After the South Korean National Human Rights
Commission urged further privacy protections, the guidelines were
amended to exclude disclosure of any information that could be
personally identifiable.121 However, routes that a confirmed-positive
patient traveled could still be disclosed, leading to ongoing concerns
about individual privacy and the consequences for businesses named
as sites visited by infected persons.122 In addition, people who are
isolated due to exposures have apps that track their whereabouts to
make sure they are adhering to the restrictions.123 Importantly, none
of the information gathered in South Korea for COVID-19 surveillance
could be used for any purpose other than disease outbreaks, including
public safety or national security.124 One commentator suggests this
“might be called virtuous surveillance—a radically transparent version
of people-tracking that is subject to public scrutiny and paired with
stringent legal safeguards against abuse.”125 This tracking method is
thus more protective against data uses that might result in other harms.
But centralized data storage still requires security protection.
Moreover, while not directly identifying individuals, public warnings
about places of possible exposure carry additional risks of harm to
these locations and individuals known to have frequented them.
In cooperation with technology companies, a variety of groups have
been developing other ways to enhance contact tracing with smart
devices. One approach uses mobile location data such as geolocation
and proximity information to trace where an individual has been. This
approach may use technology to triangulate nearby cellphone towers
with which a user’s phone has been in contact to attempt to determine
precise locations.126 The information is not stored on the individual’s
phone but is stored by the telecommunications companies. Another
method uses GPS technology to collect information through apps
running on cellphones; this is the kind of information collected by
apps to recommend nearby restaurants or describe local driving
conditions. This information is often harvested for commercial
purposes such as advertising or risk assessment based on knowledge of

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.; Kim, supra note 116.
Jo, supra note 117.
Kim, supra note 116.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mobile Location Data and Covid-19: Q&A, supra note 113.
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the app user’s habits.127 Governments may then seek access to the
information to determine the individual’s whereabouts (as indicated
by the cellphone location or from the apps) or cellphone users who
may have been in the same location.128 Such locational information
may be highly sensitive, revealing that an individual has entered a
cancer treatment center, an abortion clinic, a cannabis dispensary, or
a shop selling sex toys, among many other possibilities. Aggregate
information may also reveal the extent to which people are moving
about or practicing social distancing in a given location. Many
governments are using this aggregate data provided by commercial
firms to ascertain levels of crowding as economies reopen.129
The advantage of geolocational tracking is that it may help to
remind individuals about places they visited while they may have been
contagious. It may also supplement imperfect individual memories.
Privacy advocates and advocates of human rights have raised concerns
about these methods, however.130 Unless individuals have the ability to
abandon their phones when they go to sensitive locations, turn off any
geolocation functionality, or consent to use of this data for contact
tracing, use of the information will not be with their consent or under
their control. Critics are also very concerned that if individual
geolocation data becomes available to public health it may be used by
police, security, or immigration authorities to track movements.131
Centralized storage also increases risks of data breaches and misuse,
especially if data are stored for long periods of time or deletion is
incomplete.132 Fair information practice principles require that data

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Sam Schechner et al., Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic,
Governments Say that’s OK., WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2020, 12:01 PM),
https://wsj.com/articles/once-pariahs-location-tracking-firms-pitch-themselves-ascovid-sleuths-11592236894 [https://perma.cc/G6WV-BWXW] (reporting that
California used app data to monitor crowding at its beaches).
130. Id.; Craig Timberg & Drew Harwell, Government Efforts to Track Virus Through
Phone Location Data Complicated by Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:25 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/19/privacy-coronavirusphone-data [https://perma.cc/LPQ6-ZL3D].
131. Opinion: Location Data Could Help Fight COVID-19—But Privacy Must Be Protected,
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2020, 6:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
global-opinions/location-data-could-help-fight-covid-19--but-privacy-must-beprotected/2020/03/24/64f1eaa0-6d42-11ea-aa80-c2470c6b2034_story.html
[https://perma.cc/9CRW-DWMS].
132. Mobile Location Data and Covid-19: Q&A, supra note 113.
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use must be in accord with law, that purposes of use must be specified
and transparent, that uses must be narrowly tailored to these specified
purposes, and that data security must be protected.133 Human Rights
Watch has identified some emergency decrees for use of geolocation
data in COVID-19 tracking that may violate these guarantees.134
Another, more individually-protective digital method for contact
tracing uses Bluetooth technology. Bluetooth technology can identify
proximity among devices without locational information.135 Storage
can be distributed on individual devices rather than collected
centrally.136 A partnership between Apple and Google has been
building an infrastructure using this type of technology.137 With this
method, individuals can download an app on their phone to create an
encrypted identifier for their device.138 That app will record the
identifiers for any devices also using the app that are in sufficiently
close proximity to be picked up by Bluetooth.139 An individual who tests
positive for COVID-19 and who also has the app can then send a signal
to other app users that lets them know that a device with the
individual’s encrypted identifier has been close to them, and they
should take steps to be tested and to isolate.140 The advantage of this
approach is that it is very protective of the individual. Neither
locational information nor information about the potential exposure
source is shared—just the fact that there was device proximity
sufficient to suggest the possibility of exposure. There is no centralized
storage of data to pose security problems, either.
Some countries in the EU, with its GDPR, have pursued privacyprotective mechanisms for using new forms of surveillance. For
example, a voluntary app, developed by a German telecommunications
institute and the German public health agency, allows individuals who
consent to share data and receive notifications if they may have crossed
paths with a confirmed COVID-19 patient.141 To allay concerns that

133. Id.
134. See id. (describing examples from Israel and Russia, among other places).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Guy Chazan & Joe Miller, Contact-Tracing Apps Raise Privacy Concerns in Germany,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/32b6a360-3e22-47a3-ace560f42cc6b42d.
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these apps present unacceptable risks to privacy, they are being
developed in conformity with an initiative called “pan-European
Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing.”142 The approach is more likely
to be attractive to people with strong privacy protective concerns. The
disadvantage of this technology is its limited efficacy. It will not detect
devices that passed through the area at an earlier or later time but that
could be an exposure source. Moreover, it only works if a sufficient
number of people voluntarily download the app and enter any positive
test results into it. Professor I. Glenn Cohen and colleagues have
expressed the concern that the decentralized form may lead people to
believe that they are safe when they are not; it is highly limited in what
it can deliver, depending on whether people opt in and whether
exposures are primarily likely to occur when the devices are sufficiently
close to one another.143
The COVIDSafe app used by Australia is an apt illustration of the
limits of this Bluetooth-based approach. As of June 2020, one of the
more successful countries in containing the spread of COVID-19 was
Australia.144 Part of Australia’s strategy was its COVIDSafe app, one of
the most privacy-protective methods of digitally enhanced contact
tracing.145 Individuals are invited to download the app and provide
their name, mobile number, postcode, and age range.146 They then
receive a confirming text message to complete the installation.147 An

142. Id.
143. I. Glenn Cohen et al., Digital Smartphone Tracking for COVID-19: Public Health
and Civil Liberties in Tension, 323 JAMA 2371, 2371–72 (2020).
144. Ian Bremmer, The Best Global Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 1 Year Later,
TIME (Feb. 23, 2021, 6:07 PM), https://time.com/5851633/best-global-responsescovid-19 [https://perma.cc/9QSQ-BDFX].
145. See Rob Harris & Anthony Galloway, Workers Urged to Download App to Kick-Start
Post-COVID-19 Economy, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 27, 2020, 7:01 AM),
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/workers-urged-to-download-app-to-kickstart-post-covid-19-economy-20200426-p54nda.html [https://perma.cc/E3N6-QHZ5]
(describing the country’s strategy of providing an app with a “triple lock of privacy” to
assure its citizens that their information would be used only to help stop the spread of
the virus).
146. COVIDSafe App, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T HEALTH (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app#:~:text=The%20
COVIDSafe%20app%20helps%20find,with%20someone%20with%20COVID%2D19.
147. Id.; see also Josh Taylor, One Third of Australian Users Have Not Updated Covidsafe
App, GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2021, 12:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2021/jan/14/one-third-of-australian-users-have-not-updated-covidsafeapp (reporting that 2.1 million of the original 7.1 million Australians who downloaded

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3833629

1652

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1629

encrypted reference code is created as a unique identifier.148 Then, as
app users go about their daily lives, they must keep their phones
running, with the app turned on and Bluetooth enabled.149 Whenever
a phone running the app gets sufficiently close to another user’s
phone, it notes the date, time, distance and duration of the contact,
along with the encrypted reference code of that user.150 No location
data is collected.151 Information about contacts is collected in the app
on the user’s phone. It is automatically fully deleted after 21 days, on
the assumption that any contact more than 21 days would be outside
of the window of possible infection.152 This method protects privacy in
many ways. It requires the user to opt into the app, assigns an
encrypted unique identifier, and stores all information on the user’s
phone except the link between the individual and the encrypted
identifier that was created when the app was installed.153 No locational
information is available so there is no way to track anyone’s
movements. The only information on a user’s phone is the information
about when the user tango-ed with another device via Bluetooth.154
If a user tests positive, the Australian government website describes
the steps that will subsequently be followed.155 First, a public health
contact tracer contacts the user in the usual way. Part of the interview

the COVIDSafe app do not have the most current version, calling into question how
many are still using the app months after the federal government launched it).
148. COVIDSafe App, supra note 146.
149. Id.; see How to Use COVIDSafe, AUSTL. GOV’T, https://covidsafe.gov.au/
index.html (last visited May 13, 2021) (noting that the COVIDSafe app “does not
require continuous internet connection to stay active” and suggests users open the app
every few hours).
150. COVIDSafe App, supra note 146.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.; see Mo Hamdouna, What you Should Know About CovidSafe App and the Claim
“Your Identity Is Safeguarded.”, MO WORKS (Apr. 27, 2020), https://moworks.com.au/
moment/2020-04-27-what-you-should-know-about-covidsafe-app-and-the-claim-youridentity-is-safeguarded (comparing the app to popular social apps that obtain far more
personal information, whereas COVIDSafe has “no analytical tracking code installed”
and is “very transparent”).
154. COVIDSafe App, supra note 146.
155. Id.; see also Asha Barbaschow, Australian Committee Calls for Independent Review of
COVIDSafe App, ZDNET (Dec. 9, 2020, 2:47 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/
australian-committee-calls-for-independent-review-of-covidsafe-app
[https://perma.cc/R27S-R2CW] (following poor performance and technical issues, a
new Herald Bluetooth protocol will address Bluetooth performance and lead to more
accurate identification of potential contacts with COVID-19 positive individuals).
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is to ask whether the user has the app and is willing to allow data from
the app to be used in contact tracing—another point at which the user
has the option whether to participate. Next, if the user agrees,
encrypted information from the app is uploaded to a secure
information storage system. Health officials then use the information
to identify contacts, and proceed in the ordinary way for contact
tracing. The only difference between this method and contact tracing
that is not digitally enhanced is the information provided by the app
about proximity with other users.
Australia was initially very optimistic about the potential for the app.
However, several months into the pandemic, it appeared that the app
had not added very much to Australia’s success in pandemic control,
possibly identifying at most one case of infection that would not have
been caught through ordinary contact tracing methods. Josh Taylor, a
reporter for The Guardian, described the problems as follows.156 One
was user uptake: Australia set a target of about 40% of the population
using the app but appears to have fallen about 1.5 million users short
of that target; some Australians don’t have smartphones, others do not
use them consistently, and others were unable to or uninterested in
downloading the app. Poll data indicated that Australians did not think
that the app would be particularly effective or that the threat of the
virus was sufficiently great to warrant use of the app. Another more
significant problem was technological, having to do with use of the app
on Apple iPhones. Apple privacy protections required that the app run
on the screen of the phone, an impractical requirement for most users.
The Apple-Google interface (which would need to be retrofitted
for COVIDSafe) moves the Bluetooth connection process to the
operating system, but will not give identifying information about the
phones with which the user has been in contact. Instead, it will send
alerts to other users that their phones have had a potential exposure.
It is then up to these other users to follow up and get tested.
Digitally enhanced contact tracing thus presents an informative
example of the balance between efficacy and individual protection.
Methods that are most effective are not very individually protective,
especially if they are not voluntary, store information centrally,
and allow information to be used for purposes other than pandemic
156. Josh Taylor, How Did the Covidsafe App Go from Being Vital to Almost Irrelevant?,
GUARDIAN (May 23, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2020/may/24/how-did-the-covidsafe-app-go-from-being-vital-to-almost-irrelevant
[https://perma.cc/XVH9-XZPU].
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tracing. The description of the app in use in China illustrates a choice
to prioritize efficient disease control over protection of individual
privacy. South Korea’s method is more privacy protective but still
includes some secondary risks. Methods that are very privacy protective
are unlikely to add much to traditional contact tracing, as the
Australian example indicates. Making the methods non-voluntary and
adding geolocation data to them greatly increases efficacy. But it also
emphasizes the importance of transparency and controls on data use
other than for pandemic surveillance.
II. PRIVACY’S THEORETICAL ROOTS
Popular discussions often use the word “privacy” as a catch-all term
to cover issues of information collection, protection, and use.
Underneath the umbrella of “privacy,” however, lie important
collections of issues. Much of data protection involves security:
safeguarding information from theft, loss, corruption, or destruction.
Another set of issues concerns confidentiality: individual control over
how information drawn from them or about them is used or shared
with others. Rules such as the HIPAA “privacy” rule concern
confidentiality.157 “Privacy” more specifically refers to access to the
person. Peeping Toms, bodily searches, entrances into homes or
protected spaces, or invasion of the person in other ways violate
privacy. Privacy in this sense concerns how information might be
obtained in the first place, while confidentiality concerns whether it is
further shared. The discussion to follow uses privacy as the catch-all
term, following common usage but clarifying among these different
kinds of issues when necessary.
Multiple normative approaches underlie why these different aspects
of privacy have been valued. Summarized very crudely, they include
individualistic libertarianism, human dignity, and civil rights and antidiscrimination. The conclusions drawn from these approaches may
overlap in some respects. However, their theoretical roots are not the
same and they suggest attention to very different aspects of privacy.
One normative approach sees privacy protection in terms of
individual freedom of choice with respect to information about
themselves. This approach is rooted in the kind of liberalism that

157. See, e.g., Leslie P. Francis, Privacy and Confidentiality: The Importance of Context,
91 MONIST 52, 52–67 (2008); Nicholas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy
and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 681, 683–84 (2007).
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celebrates individual liberty in the sense of freedom from coercion.
Individuals should not be forced to relinquish information about
themselves unless they choose to do so.158 On the other hand, they
should also remain free to share information widely if that is their
desire.159 This approach may be joined to the idea that individuals have
property rights in “their” data, rights that are violated when data
miners obtain and use data without consent.160 This approach may also
contain suggestions that data protection regimes should be designed
to allow individuals to monetize “their” data if possible.161 This
individualistic view does not take direct account of the impact of
individuals’ choices on others; for example, one individual’s choice to
share her genome sequence will also reveal information about her
relatives. Nor does this view take direct account of how individual choices
to reveal—or not to reveal—information may together generate
significant social consequences. Among those consequences may be the
impact on public health of individual decisions not to share information
about their infections that might be helpful for contact tracing.
A second normative approach, predominant in European discussions,
links privacy fundamentally to human dignity and the protection of
dignity through human rights.162 In this view, privacy is constitutive of
identity and what it is to be human.163 Privacy is essential to the

158. Doug Miller, Google: Let Us Opt out of Your Data Mining Machine, WIRED,
https://www.wired.com/insights/2012/10/google-opt-out [https://perma.cc/JPK5-MRHX].
159. Reflecting this viewpoint is Colin Smith. Colin Smith, Why I Donated My Entire
Genome Sequence to the Public, CONVERSATION (Sept. 13, 2017, 4:52 PM),
https://theconversation.com/why-i-donated-my-entire-genome-sequence-to-thepublic-83741 [https://perma.cc/P8EK-4NPJ].
160. Daniel Chase, Who Owns the Data? An Argument for a Property Rights Approach to
Transatlantic Data Protection, MEDIUM (May 22, 2018), https://medium.com/
@Daniel_Chase_/who-owns-the-data-an-argument-for-a-property-rights-approach-totransatlantic-data-protection-ddc5cc8fc212 [https://perma.cc/F3RW-AHF7].
161. E.g., Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for
Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 222, 277 (2018). For criticisms of
individual property rights regimes in data, see Pamela Andanda, Towards a Paradigm
Shift in Governing Data Access and Related Intellectual Property Rights in Big Data and HealthRelated Research, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1052, 1052–81, (2019).
162. These conceptions are particularly challenging for persons with intellectual
disabilities, who may not meet normative assumptions about the nature of humanity.
See ANITA SILVERS & LESLIE P. FRANCIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 132–53 (John-Stewart Gordon, Johann-Christian Poder & Holger
Burckhart eds., 1st ed. 2016).
163. E.g., Luciano Floridi, On Human Dignity as a Foundation for the Right to Privacy,
29 PHIL. & TECH. 307, 307–12 (2016).
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development of the human personality.164 Without privacy, people may
lack the ability to exercise freedom of thought as autonomous beings,
without state surveillance or interference.165 Individual agency is
threatened by the use of algorithms that fail to treat people as persons,
even when the decisions in which they result do not discriminate or
harm.166 The dignity of the person is not the same as the exercise of
individual choice as understood in the liberal approach just described.
Instead, it includes the person as a self-governing agent, capable of
reasoned choice in accord with her values.167 On this view, privacy, in
the sense of protection from access to the person, is what is most
critical. Surveillance or even the threat of surveillance—the idea of eternally
watching virtual eyes—intrudes on personal integrity and agency.
A third normative foundation locates privacy within the project of
achieving civil rights. On this view, data collection and use may allow
businesses to continue to engage in predatory and discriminatory
practices.168 Privacy, in the sense of control of access to the person, and
confidentiality, in the sense of protection from discriminatory information
use, are essential in contexts of injustice. Surveillance enables monitoring
of people in poverty,169 detection of people without legal status,170 or

164. E.g., Bert van der Sloot, Privacy as Personality Right: Why the ECtHR’s Focus on
Ulterior Interests Might Prove Indispensable in the Age of “Big Data”, 31 UTRECHT J. OF INT’L
& EUR. L., 25, 25–27, 30 (2015).
165. Simon McCarthy-Jones, The Autonomous Mind: The Right to Freedom of Thought in
the Twenty-First Century, 2 FRONTIERS IN A.I. 1, 6 (2019); Two Sides of the Same Coin—The
Right to Privacy and Freedom of Expression, PRIV. INT’L (Feb 2, 2018),
https://privacyinternational.org/blog/1111/two-sides-same-coin-right-privacy-andfreedom-expression [https://perma.cc/X46T-QF8Q].
166. Alan Rubel et al., Algorithms, Agency, and Respect for Persons, 46 SOC. THEORY &
PRACTICE 547, 547–72 (2020).
167. Id. at 550. See generally RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds.,
1st ed. 2000).
168. Becky Chao et al., Centering Civil Rights in the Privacy Debate, NEW AM. (Aug.
2019), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/centering-civil-rights-privacy-debate
/privacy-is-a-civil-right [https://perma.cc/5RPB-3PCK].
169. See The Color of Surveillance, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/events/color-ofsurveillance-2019 [https://perma.cc/4JHA-BBHZ]; Michele E. Gilman, Welfare,
Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 2, 6 (2008).
170. See, e.g., Social Media Surveillance by Homeland Security Investigations: A Threat to
Immigrant Communities and Free Expression, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/HSI%20Social%
20Media%20Two-Pager%20-%20Brennan%20Center%2011.15.19_1.pdf
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discrimination against disfavored groups.171 Information control is an
aspect of structural injustice. In the United States, the legal strategy of
the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA) reflects a
start in the direction of a civil rights approach in that it prohibits
employers or health insurers from acquiring genetic information in
the first place, rather than placing reliance on individual choice.172
Importantly, a civil rights perspective on information does not focus in
the first instance on individual choices about whether to share
information about themselves, for the choices made by some may have
consequences for the treatment of others. Instead, information misuse
and its role in social injustice is the touchstone.
Understanding that privacy can have these quite different theoretical
roots can shed light on problematic features of U.S. privacy law.
III. INFORMATION IN CLINICAL CARE AND INFORMATION FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH
In a number of respects in the United States, the care of individual
patients and the functions of public health have been treated
separately. Public health addresses the overall health of the
population, and clinical care focuses on individuals. The standard
picture in the United States has been that the ethics of public health
rests primarily on the overall good, while the ethics of patient care rests
primarily on the choices or best interests of the individual patient.173
Information in clinical care is for that particular patient; information
in public health is for the public overall. The result may be significant
tension, if individual patients are concerned about risks to themselves
when information is shared, or if individual patients have values that
are orthogonal to the interests of the public. During the early years of
HIV/AIDS, for example, the value of confidentiality for individual
patients was seen as in potential conflict with public health reporting
requirements, resulting in special statutory protections for any
[https://perma.cc/V36A-Y9CP]; Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV.
1, 27 (2014).
171. Benjamin W. Cramer, A Proposal to Adopt Data Discrimination Rather than Privacy
as the Justification for Rolling Back Data Surveillance, 8 J. INFO. POL’Y 5, 24–25 (2018);
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671,
671–743 (2016); SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL
DISCRIMINATION (David Lyon ed. 2003).
172. Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110–233, §§ 2(3)–(5).
173. See, e.g., MARGARET P. BATTIN ET AL., THE PATIENT AS VICTIM AND VECTOR: ETHICS
AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE ch. 5 (2009).
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reported information about HIV status.174 Public health and clinical
care have been less sharply separated in countries where universal
health care is publicly funded. For example, in the United Kingdom,
public health has access to NHS clinical care data, albeit subject to
significant oversight and some ability of patients to opt out.175 These
interconnections may be particularly helpful in gathering the data
needed to address pandemics.176
In U.S. law, clinical care and public health are for the most part
treated as separate information silos. Two illustrations of this are the
structure of the HIPAA privacy rule and the failure to design electronic
medical records to include carefully delineated connections to public
health. The upshot is further difficulty for public health to address
health care disparities and social determinants of health.
The HIPAA privacy rule places uses and disclosures of health
information gleaned in clinical care into three separate management
categories: those for which uses and disclosures require patient
authorization,177 those for which patients must be given the
opportunity to object,178 and those which may occur without patient
knowledge or authorization.179 Among the latter are disclosures
required by law to public health.180 These disclosures are subject to the
requirement that they be limited to the information minimally
necessary.181 Information that has been de-identified as specified in the
privacy rule, however, is no longer subject to the requirements of the
privacy rule.182

174. E.g., Laura Lin & Bryan A. Liang, HIV and Health Law: Striking the Balance
Between Legal Mandates and Medical Ethics, 7 ETHICS JAMA 687, 687–92 (2005).
175. The current data structure in the United Kingdom includes a National Data
Guardian and Caldicott Guardians in all NHS provider organizations. The National
Data Guardian oversees implementation of the Caldicott principles for data
protection. NAT’L DATA GUARDIAN, CALDICOTT PRINCIPLES: A CONSULTATION ABOUT
REVISING, EXPANDING AND UPHOLDING THE PRINCIPLES (2020), https://www.gov.uk/
government/consultations/caldicott-principles-a-consultation-about-revisingexpanding-and-upholding-the-principles.
176. Matthew Gould et al., The Power of Data in a Pandemic, GOV.UK (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://healthtech.blog.gov.uk/2020/03/28/the-power-of-data-in-a-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/9LL5-TMZZ].
177. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2020).
178. Id. § 164.510.
179. Id. § 164.512.
180. Id. § 164.512(b).
181. Id. § 164.502(b).
182. Id. § 164.502(d).
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Once information has been disclosed to public health, it is subject
to whatever protections are granted to public health authorities in a
given state.183 State freedom of information laws may require
information to be disclosed even when drawing inferences about
particular individuals’ health conditions is a possibility.184 One area of
particular concern from a civil rights perspective is reporting of
abortions.185 In areas of the country where abortions are rare,
reporting by geographical location could reveal information about
individuals. Data suppression rules are applied using techniques such
as the suppression of release of data from cells containing numbers
below a certain threshold.186 These methods, however, may be
unevenly applied.187 In addition, reidentification risks will vary with
other types of information available, and the recognition is growing
that uniform numerical cutoffs may be either too strong to allow
important uses of information, or too weak to protect individuals
adequately.188
Interoperable electronic health records (EHRs) are now widely used
in patient care. The design of these EHRs has occurred with limited
attention to public health concerns—or indeed even with the ability to

183. Health Information Privacy: Public Health, HHS.GOV (Apr. 3, 2003),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/publichealth/index.html [https://perma.cc/99U9-545N].
184. S. Illinoisan v. Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 1, 20–21 (2006).
185. Abortion Reporting, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/
abortion-reporting [https://perma.cc/83W6-6S7M].
186. See, e.g., Utah Vital Statistics Abortions, 2018, UTAH DEP’T HEALTH (May 2020),
https://vitalrecords.health.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/Abortions-2018-UtahVital-Statistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQH5-SMTA] (“To protect individual privacy,
Utah Department of Health data suppression rules have been applied to the data in
this report. All non-zero counts which are less than five are suppressed.”); Data
Suppression/Data Aggregation Guidelines Summary, UTAH DEP’T HEALTH,
https://ibis.health.utah.gov/ibisph-view/pdf/resource/DataSuppression
Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/M94C-HDA7].
187. See, e.g., Gregory J. Matthews et al., A Review of Statistical Disclosure Control
Techniques Employed by Web-Based Data Query Systems, 23 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC.,
no. 4, 2017, at 1, 3.
188. Weiyi Xia et al., Enabling Realistic Health Data Re-Identification Risk Assessment
Through Adversarial Modeling, J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’n, Jan. 15, 2021; Krista
Wilkinson et al., Less than Five Is Less than Ideal: Replacing the “Less than 5 Cell Size” Rule
with a Risk-Based Data Disclosure Protocol in a Public Health Setting, 111 CANADIAN J. PUB.
HEALTH, Mar. 11, 2020, at 761–65; Khaled El Emam et al., Evaluating Predictors of
Geographic Area Population Size Cut-Offs to Manage Re-Identification Risk, J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASS’N, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 256–66.
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share records among providers using different electronic records
systems.189 The federal government’s Meaningful Use incentives for
healthcare providers to adopt EHRs were adopted as part of the
stimulus package in the first term of the Obama Administration.190 At
first, in order to qualify for incentive payments for adopting these
EHRs, providers were required to meet specified core standards along
with a selection of standards from an optional menu.191 Selected
capacities important to surveillance, such as electronic transfer of
laboratory results, were included within the Meaningful Use optional
menu.192 Full implementation of the Meaningful Use program now
requires providers to attest to meeting program objectives in order to
receive reimbursement from Medicare or Medicaid.193
The final Stage 3 Meaningful Use rule, issued in 2015, included
public health and clinical data registry reporting requirements as an
objective.194 This objective, however, was the only one continuing to
allow state flexibility so long as the state did not require functionality
beyond the federal requirements.195 Under this objective, eligible
providers must report meeting three measures, and eligible hospitals
must report meeting four measures.196 Measures are “immunization
registry reporting,” “syndromic surveillance reporting,” electronic
reporting to public health of cases of reportable conditions, “active

189. E.g., Todd Shryock, Sharing Patient Data: The Challenges of Healthcare
Interoperability, MED. ECON. J., Feb. 27, 2019, at 14.
190. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub.
L. No. 111–5 (2009). The Meaningful Use program was authorized under the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (“HITECH”) Act as a way
to improve health through the increased adoption and use of electronic records. 75
Fed. Reg. 44,314 (July 28, 2010). The final rule implementing stage 1 of the
Meaningful Use incentive program is at 75 Fed. Reg. 44,314–588 (July 28, 2010).
191. 75 Fed. Reg. 44,370–75 (July 28, 2010).
192. Electronic submission of reportable lab results to public health agencies was
on the stage one menu set for eligible hospitals. Eligible Professional Meaningful Use Table
of Contents Core and Menu Set Objectives, EHR INCENTIVE PROGRAM (July 2014),
https://www.cms.gov/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/EP-MU-TOC.pdf.
The
meaningful use final rule was published in 2015.
193. Meaningful Use: Qualify for EHR Incentive Programs, NUEMD,
https://nuemd.com/white-papers/qualify-ehr-incentive-programs
[https://perma.cc/G4GM-ZJTJ].
194. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive
Program-Stage 3 and Modifications for Meaningful Use in 2015 Through 2017, 80 Fed.
Reg. 62,761–955 (Oct. 16, 2015).
195. 80 Fed. Reg. 16,740 (Mar. 30, 2015).
196. 42 C.F.R. § 495.24(c)(8)(ii) (2019).
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engagement with . . . public health agenc[ies] to submit data to public
health registries,” “active engagement to submit data to a clinical data
registry,” or “active engagement with a public health agency to submit
electronic reportable of laboratory results.”197 “Active engagement”
does not mean the fully successful transfer of data but instead can
mean as little as registration to submit data or being in the process of
testing submission capabilities.198
The ability to share information between clinical care providers and
public health can bring benefits in both directions.199 Clinical records
could be queried for syndromic surveillance and for the incidents of
events that might signify outbreaks. Case reporting can occur in real
time. In return, care providers can receive alerts about the likelihood
of disease outbreaks and their management.
Multiple barriers explain the difficulties in developing connections
between public health and clinical care. One is that electronic health
records on the market today are of uneven quality.200 Another is that
hospitals with limited resources, particularly rural and safety-net
hospitals, are more likely to have EHRs with basic rather than advanced
capabilities,201 disparities that may in turn contribute to disparities in
population health.202 Public health itself was also ill-equipped to
receive data in electronic form,203 a problem that continues in the
COVID-19 pandemic.204

197. Id. § 495.24(c)(8)(ii)(A)–(F) (2020).
198. NY Medicaid EHR Incentive Program: Public Health Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs), N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH (Dec. 2019), https://www.health.ny.gov/
health_care/medicaid/redesign/ehr/faqs/phr.htm#a1.1 [https://perma.cc/B44C-CN2V].
199. Clemens Scott Kruse et al., The Use of Electronic Health Records to Support
Population Health: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 42 J. MED. SYS. 213, 214 (2018).
200. A. Jay Holmgren et al., Are All Certified EHRs Created Equal? Assessing the
Relationship Between EHR Vendor and Hospital Meaningful Use Performance, 25 J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASS’N 654, 655 (2018).
201. Julia Adler-Milstein et al., Electronic Health Record Adoption in US Hospitals: The
Emergence of a Digital “Advanced Use” Divide, J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N, Nov. 1, 2017,
at 1142–48.
202. Daniel M. Walker & Mark L. Diana, Hospital Adoption of Health Information
Technology to Support Public Health Infrastructure, 22 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC., Mar.–
Apr. 2016, at 175–81.
203. Leslie Lenert & David N. Sundwall, Public Health Surveillance and Meaningful Use
Regulations: A Crisis of Opportunity, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e1, e1–7. (2012).
204. A. Jay Holmgren et al., Barriers to Hospital Electronic Public Health Reporting and
Implications for the COVID-19 Pandemic, 27 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1306, 1306–09
(2020).
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The normative frameworks underlying privacy suggest different
responses to this divide between clinical care and public health.
Individualistic approaches would regard public health’s use of
information as a matter of individual choice. Information should not
be shared with public health without individual consent—or, at the
barest minimum, the effective opportunity for individuals to opt out of
data use.205 On this view, clinical data are private goods, not public
goods.206 Tensions between individual health and public health values
remain endemic.207
On the view that privacy is constitutive of identity, the primary
concern about interactions between individual care and public health
would be the risk of augmenting the capacities of the surveillance
state.208 Use of contact tracing technologies that monitor every
movement, such as those reported in China, would be especially
problematic on this normative view.
Finally, on the anti-discrimination approach, data use is the primary
problem, not data acquisition by itself. If public health uses data in
ways that discriminate, either overtly or covertly, that would be wrong.
The history of the Tuskegee syphilis study, leaving poor Black males
with untreated syphilis for decades, continues to reverberate in distrust
of public health in the Black community.209 On the other hand, the
failure to collect data sufficient to reveal patterns of adverse outcomes
associated with the social determinants of health may also fail to reveal
structural racism.210 The late detection of the severe problems of lead

205. This is the method used for the interchange between clinical care and public
health in the British NHS. Frédéric B. Piel et al., The Challenge of Opt-Outs from NHS
Data: A Small-Area Perspective, J. PUB. HEALTH, Mar. 26, 2018 at e594–e600.
206. Onora O’Neill, Informed Consent and Public Health, 359 THE ROYAL SOC’Y, 1133,
1133–36 (2004).
207. Amy Fairchild, Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Privacy and Public Health
Surveillance: The Enduring Tension, 9 AMA J. ETHICS 838, 838–41 (2007).
208. E.g., Peter Micek & Natalia Krapiva, Protect Digital Rights, Promote Public Health:
Toward a Better Coronavirus Response, ACCESS NOW (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://www.accessnow.org/protect-digital-rights-promote-public-health-towards-abetter-coronavirus-response [https://perma.cc/2G9R-Z5V8]; NY Medicaid EHR
Incentive Program, Public Health Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), N.Y. STATE DEP’T
HEALTH (Dec. 2019), https://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/
ehr/faqs/phr.htm#a1.1 [https://perma.cc/B44C-CN2V].
209. Rueben C. Warren et al., Trustworthiness Before Trust—Covid-19 Vaccine Trials
and the Black Community, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. e121(1), e121(1) (2020).
210. Shin Bin Tan et al., Structural Racism and COVID-19 in the USA: A County-Level
Empirical Analysis, J. RACIAL & ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES, Jan. 19, 2021.
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poisoning in the water in Flint, Michigan, is an illustration of how
failures of surveillance may both result from and contribute to injustice
by the damage they cause.211
IV. THE SECTORAL STRUCTURE OF U.S. PRIVACY LAW AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
U.S. privacy law is sectoral and this structure has consequences for
public health. Different rules about privacy may apply depending on
the type of information, the entity holding the information, the use to
be made of the information, and the jurisdiction in which the
information is held. At the federal level, different statutes and
requirements apply to health information, educational information,
driver license information, banking information, consumer credit
information, video rental information, and more.212 It matters what
kind of entity holds the information, too; for example, the HIPAA
security and privacy rules apply only to HIPAA-covered entities—
health care providers, insurers, and clearinghouses—and their
business associates.213 Uses encounter different rules, such as the
difference between health information used for clinical care and
health information used in research.214 By contrast, the European
GDPR applies to all controllers of personal data.215
One particular example of the impact of the sectoral nature of U.S.
privacy law during the pandemic is the use of apps on smart devices.
Consider a user of a smart phone in Virginia and how data collected
on that phone might be governed. Some typical apps on the phone
might include social media apps such as Facebook, a fitness app such
as Fitbit, and Google Maps. The phone’s user might have downloaded
the MyChart app, the mobile app produced by the EHR vendor used

211. Carla Campbell et al., A Case Study of Environmental Injustice: The Failure in Flint,
INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH, Sept. 27, 2016, at 5.
212. Existing Federal Privacy Laws, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 30, 2008),
https://cdt.org/insights/existing-federal-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/J439-JY9Q].
213. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/
hipaa.html#:~:text=The%20Health%20Insurance%20Portability%20and,the%20pati
ent’s%20consent%20or%20knowledge [https://perma.cc/J439-JY9Q].
214. See id.
215. What Is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr [https://perma.cc/DQ3G-3EM8].
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by the University of Virginia Medical System.216 The phone would also
be used to make telephone calls and send text messages. The phone’s
user might also have downloaded the first contact tracing app
launched in a U.S. state, COVIDWISE, downloaded in January 2020 by
almost one million residents of Virginia.217 These different smartphone
functions will collect different types of information and be governed
by different regulatory structures.
Consider first the social media apps such as Facebook. Individuals
share all kinds of information through these apps. It would not be
surprising for someone to share symptoms, a diagnosis, or a
vaccination with their friends on Facebook. The information thus
shared might be about themselves, or about friends or family members.
Individuals might also join health-related groups. Some of these
groups are public, some are for members only, and the existence of
some is hidden. Apps such as Fitbit also may collect health-related
information entered by individuals such as their weight or their levels
of activity. Fitbit can also be enabled to collect geolocation information
as it counts the steps individuals take on their walks or runs.218
Navigation devices on smartphones such as Google Maps will likely
collect or be able to infer information about where people live, where
they have gone, how long they have stayed, and what are their typical
patterns of travel.219 These devices will know when and where people
216. Medical Records, UVA HEALTH, https://uvahealth.com/patients-visitors/yourmedical-records [https://perma.cc/EKL5-H5WW].
217. Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Downloaded America’s First Coronavirus Exposure App. You
Should Too., WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/08/17/coronavirus-exposure-notification-app
[https://perma.cc/EQ8K-2J39]; Covidwise, VA. DEP’T HEALTH, https://www.vdh.
virginia.gov/covidwise [https://perma.cc/R6UW-ZF33].
218. See Steven John, How a Fitbit Is Able to Accurately Track Your Movement, and How to
Check Your Step Count on It, INSIDER (June 6, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/
how-does-fitbit-track-steps#:~:text=Your%20Fitbit%20uses
%20a%20three,step%20counter%20is%20considered%20reliable
[https://perma.cc/42WB-U5G3]; Why Is the Fitbit App Prompting Me to Turn on Location
Services?, FITBIT HELP, https://help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/2134.htm
[https://perma.cc/E2H9-UNNT].
219. Amanda Tallent, What Personal Data Do Navigation Apps Collect?, MARKTECHPOST
(July 12, 2019), https://www.marktechpost.com/2019/07/12/what-personal-data-donavigation-apps-collect [https://perma.cc/UC74-SRBP]. Even when location data is
turned off, Google can still track the location of phone users. Andrew Griffin, Google
Stores Location Data ‘Even when Users Have Told It Not to’, INDEP. (Aug. 14, 2018, 9:35
PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/google-location-dataprivacy-android-sundar-pichai-a8490636.html.
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eat in restaurants, what medical offices they visit and how long they
stay, and where they shop.220 They may also be able to link this data to
what information people search out, what they spend money on, and
what their movement histories are over time.221 Such geolocation
information has been used by researchers to estimate the extent to
which populations are complying with stay at home orders during
COVID-19.222
The primary legal structure that applies to these apps is the Federal
Trade Commission Act’s (FTC Act’s) prohibition of unfair or
deceptive trade practices.223 Under the FTC Act, commercial actors
such as Facebook or other social media sites are required to adhere to
any representations they make to consumers about privacy.224 The FTC
Act does not impose a privacy standard; it ensures that entities do not
misrepresent whatever privacy protections they offer to consumers by
stating one thing and doing another.225 In 2019, the FTC imposed a $5
billion penalty on Facebook for alleged violation of a 2012 FTC order
concerning users’ privacy.226 The 2012 order concerned the
contention that Facebook had deceived customers by telling them they
could keep information they put on Facebook private and then
allowing the information to be made public.227 Under the order,
Facebook was required not to violate its promises, the deceptive trade
practice at issue, and to submit to regular privacy audits.228 The order
extended to apps available through the Facebook site.229 A 2019
220. See Tallent, supra note 219.
221. Id.
222. See Mobile Location Data and Covid-19: Q&A, supra note 113. In rare situations,
the FTC will also apply its enforcement authority against unfair trade practices
involving electronic transfers of information. The FTC standard for unfairness is based
on whether the practice is likely to cause substantial injury not otherwise reasonably
avoidable by consumers and not outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition.
FTC, FTC’S USE OF ITS AUTHORITIES TO PROTECT CONSUMER PRIVACY AND SECURITY 2
(2020).
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
224. See id. § 57b.
225. See id. § 54–55.
226. Lesley Fair, FTC’s $5 Billion Facebook Settlement: Record-Breaking and HistoryMaking, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 24, 2019, 8:52 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-recordbreaking-history [https://perma.cc/5GBA-KBCL].
227. Id.
228. Statement of the Commission at 1, In re Facebook Inc., Docket No. C-4365
(Aug. 10, 2012).
229. Id.
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stipulated order for civil monetary penalties was based on the
contention (neither admitted nor denied by Facebook) that Facebook
had failed to live up to the 2012 order.230 In 2020, the 2012 order was
modified in accord with the 2019 stipulated order to establish
mechanisms to create multiple channels of compliance to ensure the
accountability of Facebook executives for privacy protection.231
To take another example of a privacy violation by an app, Flo Health
markets the Flo Period & Ovulation Tracker, a highly popular app used
by consumers to help predict ovulation and aid in pregnancy.232 Users
enter sensitive details about their menstruation and gynecological
health into the Flo App.233 The App promised to keep the information
secret and not share health details.234 Instead, Flo shared information
with marketing services through Google and through Facebook’s
analytics, without taking any action to limit what these firms could do
with the information; the information was used for a variety of
purposes, including advertising.235 The FTC reached a settlement
agreement with Flo in January 2021.236
In contrast, if a Virginia consumer has downloaded the MyChart app
for use in communicating with her health care provider, MyChart
would be subject to the protections of the HIPAA privacy rule
applicable to business associates of HIPAA-covered entities.237 A user
of the MyChart app will be asked whether they are willing to share their

230. Stipulated Order for Civil Penalty, Monetary Judgment, and Injunctive Relief
at 1, United States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019).
231. FTC Gives Final Approval to Modify FTC’s 2012 Privacy Order with Facebook with
Provisions from 2019 Settlement, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/04/ftc-gives-final-approvalmodify-ftcs-2012-privacy-order-facebook [https://perma.cc/E7AK-TUNN].
232. Natasha Singer, Flo Settles FTC Charges of Misleading Users on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2021, 1:53 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/business/floprivacy.html [https://perma.cc/LYD4-CDP9].
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Developer of Popular Women’s Fertility-Tracking App Settles FTC Allegations that It
Misled Consumers About the Disclosure of their Health Data, FED. TRADE COMM’N (January
13, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/01/developerpopular-womens-fertility-tracking-app-settles-ftc [https://perma.cc/EZ5D-K7BB].
237. Health Information Privacy: Business Associates, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/business-associates/index.html
[https://perma.cc/4K7Y-BAWH].
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locational information.238 She will also be greeted with conditions for
use that include a variety of terms and conditions concerning data
privacy and security.239 The generic MyChartCentral privacy policy
states that individuals will be able to transfer personal information to
other providers or to download the information to local devices.240
Patients are also told that after the information has been transferred
from MyChart it cannot be retrieved, controlled, or limited in use by
MyChart.241 They are not told explicitly, however, that this means that
the information, once transferred, no longer has the protections of
HIPAA.242 The generic privacy policy also informs users that
information from them may be used to develop the service, investigate
violations of service policies and comply with any applicable law
including service of legal process, protect the personal safety or health
of the public, and protect the rights and property of MyChart.243
Presumably this provision includes legally-required reports to public
health and information that might, in the judgment of MyChart, have
implications for the health of the public such as a pandemic or
bioterrorism threat.
In addition to these apps, the smartphone customer will presumably
also use the phone to send or receive text messages and to make or
receive ordinary telephone calls. If so, these uses will be governed by a
variety of federal laws. They will be protected by the federal Telephone
Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006.244 This law criminalizes
fraudulent access to confidential phone records, internet access to
customer accounts without prior authorization, and the sale or transfer
of confidential phone records without authorization.245 It also
prohibits unauthorized purchase or receipt of these records.246 More
generally, telecommunications are regulated by the Federal

238. See What You Can Do with MyChart, MYCHART, https://www.mychart.com/
Features [https://perma.cc/J987-JFDX].
239. Experience of the author in signing up for the MyChart app, on file with the
author.
240. MyChartCentral & Lucy Privacy Policy, EPIC MYCHART CENT. (July 1, 2020),
https://www.mychartcentral.com/PrivacyPolicy.aspx [https://perma.cc/NDR3-B5FZ].
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109476, 120 Stat. 3568, 3569.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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Communications Act of 1934 as amended,247 and the sale or transfer
of cellphone information is subject to the exceptions of that act.248
These exceptions to the duty to protect the confidentiality of users of
telecommunications services include billing, call location information
in response to a user’s call for emergency services, or information
solely for purposes of delivering emergency services.249 In addition, the
Stored Communications Act of 1986 as amended (SCA) delineates
how law enforcement may compel third parties such as cellphone
companies to disclose customer information.250 The SCA is structured
to prohibit electronic communication service providers from
knowingly divulging the contents of electronically stored
information—unless the disclosure falls within specified exceptions.251
These specified exceptions include when service providers have the
consent of a communication’s originator or intended recipient,270
when law enforcement agencies determine contents appear to pertain
to the commission of a crime,271 or when governmental entities believe
disclosure is needed to prevent death or serious physical injury in an
emergency.
Federal constitutional protections also may apply to law enforcement
efforts to access information such as locational information from
cellphones.252 The scope of these protections, however, remains an area of
vibrant controversy; for example, the Supreme Court has said that mapping
a cellphone location for 127 days violates expectations of privacy253 but the
standard on which this judgment is based remains unclear.254
State laws, too, may come into play regarding the information on the
consumer’s smart phone. If the consumer is in Virginia, for example,
she would also have the protections of Virginia law. These protections
include the Virginia Medical Records Privacy Law, which mirrors the
247. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–624.
248. 18 U.S.C. § 1039(b)(2).
249. 47 U.S.C. § 222(d).
250. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848, 1857.
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1).
252. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
253. Id. at 2218–19.
254. E.g., Matthew Tokson, Inescapable Surveillance, 105 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021); Matthew Tokson & Ari Ezra Waldman, Social Norms in Fourth
Amendment Law, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE L.J. F. 943 (2019); Susan Freiwald
& Stephen Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV.
205 (2018).
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structure of the HIPAA privacy rule in the context of Virginia law
regarding disclosures.255 Unlike the federal HIPAA statute and
regulations, however, the Virginia law has been interpreted to provide
private rights of action for negligence in disclosures.256 Virginia
consumers would also have rights to notification of certain breaches of
personal information257 and to protection from the non-consensual
sale of personal information by merchants with fixed retail locations.258
If the consumer were a California resident, however, she would have
the protections of the far more expansive California Consumer Privacy
Act (CCPA).259 Bills adopting the protections of the CCPA were
introduced in the Virginia General Assembly in 2020 but were
continued until 2021.260
This sectoral structure of U.S. privacy law presents different
problems depending on the normative lens through which privacy is
viewed. The problem is not just the complexity, which is daunting even
for privacy professionals. Rather, it extends beyond the sheer
complexity to what the differences and gaps mean as they actually
occur when confronted by people.
From the perspective of individual freedom of choice, concerns
begin with the rationale for separating identifiable from deidentified
information and leaving the latter largely unregulated except for
protections against re-identification. The thought might be that
deidentified information no longer concerns the individual because
the individual can no longer be targeted. However, individuals still
might wish to object to how information drawn from them is used.
Individuals may also be affected significantly by how deidentified
information is used, as described above.
From the perspective of individual freedom of choice, the complexity
creates difficulties in exercising choice. Individuals find it time
consuming and inefficient to review lengthy disclosure documents and

255. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03 (West 2020).
256. See Harris v. United States, No. 3:10cv00027, 2010 WL 2733448, at *6 (E.D. Va.
2010), aff’d, 417 Fed. App’x 285 (4th Cir. 2011); Smith v. Kryzanowski, 69 Va. Cir. 185,
185 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
257. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (West 2020).
258. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-442 (West 2021).
259. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–
1798.199.100 (West 2018).
260. H.B. 473, 2020 Sess. (Va. 2020) (personal data, management, and oversight).
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privacy policies that are difficult to understand.261 The sectoral nature
of privacy law means that there will be many such documents, reviewed
one by one. Individuals will have no easy way to be sure that there are
not unanticipated interconnections among their agreements to
privacy policies, such as the possibility that their use of an app may
result in information being shared through a social media site that they
also have signed up to use. Logging into services such as the grocery
delivery firm Instacart is made easy by continuing with Facebook or
Google, which gives Instacart the user’s name, profile picture, and
email address.262 The Instacart privacy policy informs users who log in
using this method that public profile information and information
about Facebook contacts will also be shared with Instacart.263 To the
extent that people are dependent for essential services on the
electronic interchange of information, they may find themselves in
situations in which they lack effective choices. Privacy policies of firms
such as Instacart, which may be the only available way for people to
receive grocery or medication deliveries in a pandemic, may contain
disclosures that may be very important to people. For example, out of
necessity for safe delivery, Instacart will be informed whether
medication requires refrigeration; although other health information
will not be revealed, the information will also include the cost of the
drug, which could be highly informative.264 Instacart also informs users
that information may be shared in a variety of circumstances. These
circumstances include when believed reasonably to comply with
applicable laws or “requests from law enforcement.” They also include
sharing information with third parties such as advertising services
“under appropriate confidentiality provisions” and protecting “the
safety, rights, or property of any person, the public, or Instacart.”265
These are very broad provisions about sharing information which are
not immediately apparent from the delivery pages of grocery stores

261. E.g., Brooke Auxier et al., Americans’ Attitudes and Experiences with Privacy Policies
and Laws, PEW RSCH. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-attitudes-andexperiences-with-privacy-policies-and-laws [https://perma.cc/53DN-S6EZ].
262. Privacy Policy, INSTACART (June 19, 2020), https://www.instacart.com/privacy;
Account Information, INSTACART: HELP CTR., https://www.instacart.com/help/
section/360007902871 (last visited May 13, 2021).
263. See Privacy Policy, supra note 262.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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using Instacart as their third party delivery service.266 On the other
hand, many people find these services quite convenient and it may be
that different disclosures are relevant to information use in different
contexts.
From the perspective of identity, the ubiquity of information
collection is of paramount importance. On this approach to privacy, a
significant issue about the sectoral nature of U.S. privacy law is the
sheer difficulty it poses for keeping track of consents to data collections,
uses and disclosures. With multiple standards and concomitant
differences and gaps in their application, the implications of data
collection in one area for data collection in another area may pass
unnoticed. Some of the most pervasive forms of data collection, those
involving geolocation data, may be some of the least regulated and
most opaque. The data collected through the Google Maps app is
regulated by the FTC prohibition on unfair and deceptive trade
practices; individuals with the function turned on may unwittingly
agree to be tracked as they go about their daily lives, revealing sensitive
health information as they move along.267 Their smartphone locations
will be tracked by a different system of triangulated cellphone towers;
whether this information can be accessed by law enforcement without
a warrant may depend on whether the courts believe that the tracking
is sufficiently comprehensive.268 Stringent data protection standards in
one area—such as the barriers between data collected in research and
data used for public health that were encountered in the Seattle flu
study—may create the illusion that people are far better protected
than they are. Yet, as discussed below, the two models most relevant to
the United States for creating universal privacy protections, the GDPR
and the CCPA, both rely heavily on notice and choice.
Finally, an anti-discrimination perspective may shed a different light
on the sectoral nature of U.S. privacy law. Deidentified data drawn
from all of the many different sources represented on a user’s smart
phone—along with data from other users’ smart devices, from clinical
records, and from publicly-availably data sets such as census data—can

266. E.g., Delivery, SMITH’S, https://www.smithsfoodanddrug.com/i/ways-toshop/delivery (last visited May 13, 2021) (“Our Partner Does the Shopping for You”).
267. David Nield, All the Ways Google Tracks You—And How to Stop It, WIRED (May 27, 2019,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-tracks-you-privacy [https://perma.cc/QU39QXS4].
268. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
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be immensely valuable for many different purposes.269 Sectoral privacy
law does not present a common approach to data drawn from these
multiple different sectors. Nor does it provide a mechanism for
addressing the implications of merging data sets drawn from these
multiple sources.
Some of the purposes for which multi-source “big” data may be used
are health related and could be beneficial to health, determining
where medical equipment may be needed, or where there might be
sufficient circulation of the virus to allow testing of whether a vaccine
may confer immunity. As outlined above, big data sets are also critical
to syndromic surveillance efforts to provide early warning of outbreaks
or their potential spread.270 Big data may also cast important light on
social determinants of health.
At the same time, the commercial value of these same data should
give pause, both with respect to the data collected and with respect to
its potential uses. As discussed above, data may be more or less
representative of people in different groups. It may magnify or distort
some characteristics and minimize others; discussions of the
potentially discriminatory disparate impact of big data analytics are
widespread.271 Potential commercial uses may impact social
determinants of health, such as housing, transportation, or access to
health care.272 These data sets can be analyzed to predict economic
activity and direct investment or marketing, choices that may benefit
some communities or disadvantage others. It might suggest a fall in
housing prices that could encourage lenders to file quickly for
foreclosures. It might help health care systems to determine which
units are likely to be profitable and which should be closed, or where
clinics could be located to attract the most financially attractive users.
From an anti-discrimination perspective, these data uses are what
matter. Deidentification is beside the point, if the information can
yield inferences that disadvantage even without individual identifiers.
Moreover, notice to individuals and the choices they make occur one
269. E.g., Arvind Singh, Is Big Data the New Black Gold?, WIRED (Feb. 2013),
https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/02/is-big-data-the-new-black-gold
[https://perma.cc/J89W-XV32].
270. Wilder-Smith et al., supra note 63, at 102–04.
271. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 171, at 671–73 (2016) (noting that big data
analytics can dramatically disrupt “civil rights protections in how personal information
is used in housing, credit employment, health, education, and the marketplace”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
272. Id. at 674–75.
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by one. As the next Part argues, these are the most common methods
for addressing the privacy and confidentiality of identifiable data but
cannot address the mounting effects of large-scale data sets drawn from
many sources.
V. PRIVACY PROTECTION BEYOND NOTICE AND CHOICE
Notice and choice is the dominant method utilized for privacy
protection within both the United States and the European Union.
This Part describes how notice and choice functions and explains why
it does not solve the problems identified with the separation between
clinical care and public health and the sectoral nature of U.S. privacy
protection. All three of the examples described—the E.U.’s GDPR, the
HIPAA privacy rule, and the California CPPA—apply notice and
choice only to identifiable personal information, excluding
deidentified information.
A. Three Examples of Notice and Choice Privacy: The E.U. GDPR, the U.S.
HIPAA Privacy Rule, and the California CPPA
The GDPR is built on the protection of individually identifiable data
through notice and choice. U.S. consumers may have become familiar
with these requirements after entities sharing data between the United
States and the European Union introduced new privacy notices to
conform to the implementation of the GDPR in 2018.273 The GDPR
sets out rules for the protection of “natural persons” in the “processing
of personal data.”274 “Natural person” is not a defined term in the
GDPR, but “personal data” is defined as:
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic,
cultural or social identity of that natural person . . . .”275

273. Kristin Archick & Rachel F. Fefer, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10896, EU DATA
PROTECTION RULES AND U.S. IMPLICATIONS (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
row/IF10896.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MLV-VDK4].
274. GDPR, supra note 68, art. 1(1), at 32.
275. Id. art. 4(1), at 33.
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Applying to all processing of personal data,276 the GDPR is thus nonsectoral in its approach.
Rights of the data subject under the GDPR begin with transparent
information.277 When information is obtained directly from data
subjects, they must be told the identity and contact details of the data
controller, the purposes of data processing, the legal basis for the data
processing, the legitimate interests of the data processor, the recipients
or categories of recipients of personal data, and, where applicable, the
fact that the data processor intends to transfer personal data to third
countries or international organizations.278 Individuals must also be
informed about the time periods for which data will be stored, the right
to request rectification or erasure of the data, the right to withdraw
consent to data processing prospectively, and the possible existence of
data profiling and its significance.279 Rights regarding data profiling
are the rights of individuals not to be subject to decisions which
produce legal or other similar effects concerning them,280 except
decisions necessary to enter into contracts between the data subject
and the data controller, decisions authorized by member state law with
appropriate safeguards to which the controller is subject, and decisions
based on the data subject’s explicit consent.281 Data subjects must also
be provided further information when personal data are to be
repurposed.282 Similar disclosure requirements apply when the data
are obtained from a source other than the data subject, with exceptions
including that the data subject already has the information or the
provision of the information would not be possible or would involve
disproportionate effort in particular for processing in the public
interest or for scientific research.283 These exceptions provide a great
deal of scope for repurposing data that have been obtained from third
party sources although they do specifically recognize carve outs that
will include public health and health research.284

276. Id. art. 2(1), at 32. There are exceptions for data processing that falls outside
of the scope of EU law. Id. art. 2(2)(a)–(d), at 32.
277. Id. art. 12(1), at 39.
278. Id. art. 13(1)(a)–(f), at 40–41.
279. Id. art. 13(2)(a)–(c), (f), at 41.
280. Id. art. 22(1), at 46.
281. Id. art. 22(2)(a)–(c), at 46. Further protections apply if the data involve special
categories of sensitive information. Id. art. 22(4), at 46.
282. Id. art. 13(3), at 41.
283. Id. art. 14(1), (5)(a)–(b), at 41–42.
284. Id. art. 14(5)(b), at 42.
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Once given the information about proposed data collection and use,
data subjects under the GDPR may choose not to share information.285
Consumers who do not share information, however, may not be able
to enjoy services that are available over the internet such as browsing
on a website or placing orders for products.286 Consumers who do
share information have further rights that include access, rectification,
erasure, and restriction of processing.287 Explicit consent for specific
purposes and other requirements apply to processing of data falling into
these special categories: data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership,
health, sex life or sexual orientation, and genetic information.288
The HIPAA privacy rule is part of the sectoral structure of U.S.
privacy law, applying only to protected health information possessed
by covered entities and their business associates. As described above,
HIPAA follows a structure of requiring notice for some but not all data
uses of individually identifiable health information possessed by these
entities.289 Deidentified data are outside the purview of the rule.290
“Authorization” is the HIPAA term of art for consent that must meet
specific formal written requirements.291 Examples of when
authorization is required include uses for marketing and for the sale
of information.292 Authorization is also required for use in research,293
unless conditions for a waiver of authorization are met.294 Data uses for
treatment, payment, or health care operations do not require
authorization.295 Many uses and disclosures of identifiable information
drawn from clinical records do not require authorization, including
information to public health as required by law.296 Notice and choice
under HIPAA thus does not apply at all to deidentified information
nor to some important uses of information regarding health.
285. Id. art. 21(1), at 45.
286. See id.
287. Id. arts. 15–18, at 43–44.
288. Id. art. 9(1), (2)(a), at 38.
289. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2018).
290. Id. § 164.502(d)(1).
291. Id. § 164.508(b)(1).
292. Id. § 164.508(a)(3), (4).
293. Health Information Privacy: Research, HHS (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/research/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3VJN-MQR6].
294. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508(a)(1), 164.512(b)(i).
295. Id. § 164.506(a).
296. Id. § 164.502(d)(1).
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In addition to the authorization requirements, under HIPAA,
individuals have rights to access and request copies of what is called
the “designated record set” of individual health information297 and to
request amendment of errors.298 Individuals also have a right to request
an accounting of disclosures of identifiable information, but this does
not include uses for treatment, payment, or health care operations.299
Individuals thus are able to learn about some, but not all, uses and
disclosures of individually identifiable health information.
The California CPPA is the most comprehensive privacy law enacted
by a state in the United States. The CPPA went into effect January 1,
2020; it will be augmented by the California Privacy Rights Act (CRPA),
a ballot measure approved in November 2020 that will take effect
January 1, 2023.300 The CPPA, as augmented by the CRPA, mirrors the
European GDPR in large part for the data that is does cover301 but
maintains the sectoral nature of U.S. privacy law in many respects. It
does not apply to deidentified data, except to prohibit reidentification
of deidentified health information.302 It excepts from coverage
information covered by a number of important statutes, including
information protected by the California Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act, HIPAA, information protected under federal
consumer credit reporting laws, financial information protected under
Gramm-Leach-Bliley or the California Financial Information Privacy
Act, information protected under the Federal Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act, and information collected in research governed by the
Federal Common Rule or the FDA.303 There are also exceptions for
information collected in the employer-employee relationship and in
business-to-business relationships.304
297. Id. § 164.524(a).
298. Id.
299. Id. § 164.528(a)(i).
300. California Proposition 24, Consumer Personal Information Law and Agency Initiative
(2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_24,_Consumer
_Personal_Information_Law_and_Agency_Initiative_(2020).
301. Cameron F. Kerry & Caitlin Chin, By Passing Proposition 24, California Voters up
the Ante on Federal Privacy Law, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/11/17/by-passing-proposition-24california-voters-up-the-ante-on-federal-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/3ME8-3X8Y]
(finding that the scope of the protections is limited because they still rely on the notice
and consent model and keep the burden on people to opt out of the sale of their data).
302. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.148 (West 2020).
303. Id. § 1798.145.
304. Id.
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For the data it does cover, the CPPA functions primarily as a notice
and choice structure, requiring businesses over a certain size in
revenues or numbers of people from whom data are collected to
inform consumers about the categories of personal information to be
collected and the uses to which the information collection will be
put.305 Individuals have the rights to request deletion of personal
information, with important exceptions such as for research in the
public interest subject to informed consent and other applicable legal
protections.306 It also gives consumers the right to opt out of data sales
of personal information.307 These notice and choice requirements,
however, are limited by the CPPA’s situation within the sectoral
structure of U.S. privacy law as they do not apply to information
beyond the statute’s scope.
B. Beyond Notice and Choice
As the primary way of protecting privacy, notice and choice is
problematic from the perspective of all three of the normative
approaches underpinning privacy. As an initial point, notice and
choice are ill-suited to address any use of deidentified data. Through
notice and choice, people may be told that data may be deidentified
and transferred, sold, or used in various ways, but that is all. Once the
data are deidentified, there will be no way to go back to individuals if
new uses appear important, nor will there be ways to remove
information from individuals who have decided that they would like
data drawn from them to no longer be used. Notice and choice can
only function before deidentification occurs. It is thus a very blunt
instrument for deidentified data: either agree, or refuse further
deidentified use of data.
Now, it may seem that the use of deidentified data is innocuous from
the perspective of individuals. After all, the premise of
deidentification—assuming it is effective—is that individuals can no
longer be singled out in any way. There will be no way to know whether
information drawn from individuals has been used in ways that they
might find outrageous, or whether individuals have characteristics that
might be used to discriminate against or otherwise harm them. But
there are many reasons for concern. Individuals may wish not to take

305. Id. § 1798.100.
306. Id. § 1798.105.
307. Id. § 1798.120.
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the risk that information drawn from them could be put to purposes
with which they deeply disagree—say, abortion research. This is a
problem especially for those who believe respect for individual choice
is a justification for privacy. As discussed above, comparatively
complete portraits may be constructed from complex sets of
deidentified information, portraits that allow inferences to be drawn
about individuals even when no identifying information is included in
the portraits. This is a problem for privacy as identity. Perhaps most
importantly, deidentified data, when subjected to developing
techniques of algorithmic analysis, may yield information that can have
discriminatory or stigmatizing impact on groups.308 This is a problem
for privacy as anti-discrimination. But some uses of deidentified data
really matter for public health. As outlined above, deidentified data
may be particularly important for the syndromic surveillance needed
to provide early warning of outbreaks and their possible pandemic
spread. Notice and choice, therefore, is problematic as an approach to
deidentified data.
Earlier Parts have described other problems that also surface for
notice and choice. The points are commonly made that individuals
may not read or understand privacy policies because they lack time,
sophistication, or interest. The sectoral nature of U.S. privacy law adds
complexity if individuals make separate choices about information in
different spheres without the information or understanding to
determine how the choices may interact with or have implications for
one another. Choices made one-by-one may threaten identity or
mount up to discriminatory impact. Behind these problems lies an
overarching issue for notice and choice: that information drawn from
many individuals presents a collective action problem. Individuals’
choices may affect only the use of their own information; it cannot,
however, affect how the choices of others may combine to yield results
that have significant implications for them, including the use of data
that they sought to prevent by decisions to opt out, the use of
information in ways that undermine dignity, or the use of information
to discriminate.
Anti-discrimination brings the focus most forcefully away from
individual choice to data use. Notice and choice places the focus on a
particular decision about whether to share information. It does tell an

308. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in
Research?, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 6–9 (2010).
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individual about a proposed data use. Even here, the individual may
need to agree to reveal the data in order to obtain an important good,
such as an accommodation on the job, and may have difficulties in
protecting themselves from discrimination once the information has
been revealed. Statutes such as GINA and the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) do provide some protections against information
requests that might present particularly direct discrimination risks.309
Employers may not request genetic information and they may not
require employees to provide information about their disabilities as a
condition of being offered jobs.310 The scope of these protections is
limited, however.311 And individual notice and choice does not protect
one person against the choices made by others, either individually or
collectively.
On the other side, it is also worth noting that notice and choice may
present significant barriers to data use for public health or for
determining variations in the social determinants of health. If people
refuse to share information about their own health, critical
information needed for case identification and contact tracing may
not be available. If there are patterns of suspicion and reluctance to
share information, signals that should sound alarms may pass
unrecognized. Selective data sets may magnify or distort differences,
leading to characterizations that can stigmatize groups. Notice and
choice, in short, is a poor instrument for protecting individuals and
societies against personal harms, disease spread, and systemic injustice.
CONCLUSION: SUPPLANTING NOTICE AND CHOICE PRIVACY
Moving beyond notice and choice is thus necessary if data are to be
used responsibly for public health. But what directions might this
movement take? Transparency and enactment of statutory limits on
data uses are the two most prominent possibilities.
Transparency could require entities collecting, possessing and using
information drawn from more than a specified number of individuals
to make public disclosures of their information collection, possession, and
use. There are models for developing such transparency requirements.
The California CPPA could provide a model for delineating the size of

309. Genetic Information Discrimination, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/geneticinformation-discrimination [https://perma.cc/W5A3-JWFQ].
310. Id.
311. See id.
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entities required to make such disclosures.312 The requirements to
disclose the results of federally funded research could provide a model
for the form disclosures could take.313 The Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) could provide a model for
how making information available could enable watchdog groups or
groups with particular interest to call attention to particular forms of
data protection and use.314
Prohibition of certain forms of data collection and use is both more
drastic and more problematic. The observation that over-regulation
may lead to under-regulation is common.315 Although there are models
of prohibition, in particular GINA and the ADA, these models are
limited in scope and of limited efficacy because they can be avoided in
so many ways.316 At present, moreover, our knowledge of the universe
of data use and the impacts of these uses is woefully incomplete.
Required transparency about data collection, possession, and use may
be a needed initial step to increase public discussion about the benefits
and burdens of data use, including its use in pandemic emergencies.
Notice and choice is a move in the wrong direction for the evolution
of data use in pandemics.

312. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020).
313. Id. § 1798.130.
314. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601,
§ 101, 104 Stat. 3408, 3408 (1990).
315. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Mendeloff’s The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How
Overregulation Causes Underregulation, 19 RAND J. ECONS. 489, 490 (1988).
316. See Sarah Zhang, The Loopholes in the Law Prohibiting Genetic Discrimination,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/03/
genetic-discrimination-law-gina/519216 [https://perma.cc/3HGB-44LJ] (finding
that although GINA covers “employers and health insurance companies . . . [it fails to]
cover schools, mortgage lending, or housing”).
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